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Abstract 
Few quantitative studies exist on tuition outcomes resets despite increasing 
frequency and interest among industry practitioners. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the relationship between sticker price elasticity and changes in first-year student 
enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, percent of first-year 
students who are Pell-eligible, and changes in transfer student enrollment using 
multivariate logistic and linear regression models. The independent variable is the sticker 
price elasticity of demand from two years preceding the announcement of a reset.  
This study contributes to the literature by adding to evidence regarding the 
signaling role of sticker price in higher education and provides a template for future 
studies regarding the impact of tuition resets. For industry practitioners, this study 
provides an overview of tuition reset outcomes and indicators of the suitability of tuition 
resets as a strategy at the institutional level. This study finds sticker price elasticity is a 
poor predictor of tuition reset success. Increases to advertising spending and gains in net 
assets in the years prior to the reset are more consistent predictors of success. This study 
also finds no evidence of a direct correlation or of “threshold effects” between the size of 
a reset and the number of first-year students enrolled or net tuition and fee revenue 
increases. 
The study concludes with applications of findings and recommendations for 
future research with emphasis on the role of advertising as a mechanism to explain the 
rationale for resetting. 
Keywords: Sticker price elasticity, price strategy, tuition elasticity, higher 
education pricing, tuition reset, tuition rollback  
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Definition of Terms 
This study uses the following terms, phrases, and acronyms which are essential for 
understanding: 
Circular Area Profiles (CAPS) 
An application of the Missouri Census Data Center that aggregates data from the 
American Community Survey (ACS) from the U.S. Census to approximate 
circular areas and radius values and provide summary demographic statistics 
(Missouri Census Data Center, 2019). 
Contact Hour 
A period of time consisting of (1) A 50- to 60-minute class, lecture, or recitation 
in a 60-minute period; (2) A 50- to 60-minute faculty-supervised laboratory, shop 
training, or internship in a 60-minute period; or (3) 60 minutes of preparation in a 
correspondence course (NCES National Center for Education Statistics, 2017).  
Credence Goods 
Credence goods are items in which the benefits are unknown and may never be 
fully known (e.g. purchase of insurance, dental work, quality of training product 
warranties). They are difficult to evaluate. Credence goods are purchased on the 
belief they will deliver a benefit, even if the customer is unaware of its doing so 
(Smith, 2017; Wirtz & Lovelock, 2016).  
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Discount Rate: 
Discount Rate refers to the reduction in costs students pay, expressed as a 
percentage of costs. Unless otherwise specified, Discount Rate is assumed to refer 
to the NACUBO Discount Rate calculation (described below). 
Direct Cost of Attendance (DCOA or Sticker Price): 
DCOA is the cost of attendance that is charged directly by the college or 
university (e.g. tuition, fees, room and board as published). It does not include 
books and supplies (Sallie Mae, 2018). DCOA is also referred to as sticker price. 
First-year Student: 
A student who has completed less than the equivalent of one full year of 
undergraduate work that is less than 30 semester hours (in a 120-hour degree 
program) or less than 900 contact hours (NCES National Center for Education 
Statistics, 2017). 
Form 990: 
Tax-exempt organizations are required to file a Form 990 on an annual basis with 
the IRS in lieu of a tax return. This information is used by regulators, funders, 
journalists and the general public to evaluate the organization’s operational and 
financial performance (Blazek & Adams, 2009). 
Full-time Student: 
Undergraduate: A student enrolled for 12 or more semester credits, or 12 or more 
quarter credits, or 24 or more contact hours a week each term. (NCES National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2017) 
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GuideStar: 
GuideStar is a non-profit organization that provides a searchable database of Form 
990s and other forms of information on over 2.7 million nonprofits (GuideStar, 
2019) to libraries, fundraising organizations, and the general public. 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS): 
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System is an NCES database to 
which all Title IV receiving institutions must provide accurate data aggregated at 
the institutional level. Data is collected via 11 surveys (called catalogs).  
National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES): 
“The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) is the primary federal 
entity for collecting and analyzing data related to education in the U.S. and other 
nations. NCES is located within the U.S. Department of Education and the 
Institute of Education Sciences. NCES fulfills a Congressional mandate to collect, 
collate, analyze, and report complete statistics on the condition of American 
education; conduct and publish reports; and review and report on education 
activities internationally.”(Institute of Education Sciences, 2018) 
National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO): 
“The National Association of College and University Business Officers 
(NACUBO) is a membership organization representing more than 1,900 colleges 
and universities across the country. NACUBO specifically represents chief 
business and financial officers through advocacy efforts, community service, and 
professional development activities. The association’s mission is to advance the 
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economic viability, business practices and support for higher education 
institutions in fulfillment of their missions.”(NACUBO, 2018) 
NACUBO Discount Rate: 
The NACUBO Discount Rate is the percentage of tuition and fees charged given 
back in the form of institutional grant aid using both funded and unfunded sources 
(NACUBO, 2016). This is the most frequently used form of calculating a discount 
rate (Ruffalo Noel Levitz, 2017). 
Net Price: 
The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 defines institutional net price as 
“the average yearly price actually charged to first-time, full-time undergraduate 
students receiving student aid at an institution of higher education after deducting 
such aid.” In IPEDS, average institutional net price is generated by subtracting the 
average amount of federal, state/local government, or institutional grant and 
scholarship aid from the total cost of attendance (NCES National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2017). 
Overall Discount Rate: 
An overall discount rate is the percentage of tuition, fees, room and board charged 
given back in the form of institutional grant aid using both funded and unfunded 
sources (Ruffalo Noel Levitz, 2017). This is an important variation on NACUBO 
Discount Rate as it assesses discounting against room and board revenues as well. 
Price Elasticity: 
Price elasticity is a microeconomic concept employed to measure price sensitivity  
(Kagan, 2010). Short for price elasticity of demand, price elasticity is the 
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percentage change in quantity demanded of a good produced by a one percent 
change in its price, holding all other factors constant (Fischer et al., 1988). See 
Appendix C for further information. 
Room and Board: 
Room charges are “the charges for an academic year for rooming 
accommodations for a typical student sharing a room with one other student.” 
Board charges are “Charges assessed students for an academic year for meals.” 
(NCES National Center for Education Statistics, 2017). 
Sticker Price: 
Sticker price refers to the direct cost of attendance in this study. Indirect costs 
such as estimated books and travel expenses are not considered in this study.  
Tuition and Fees: 
“The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most 
frequently charged to students. These values represent what a typical student 
would be charged and may not be the same for all students at an institution. If 
tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour basis, the average full-time credit hour load 
for an entire academic year is used to estimate average tuition. Required fees 
include all fixed sum charges that are required of such a large proportion of all 
students that the student who does not pay the charges is an exception.” (NCES 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2017)  
Tuition Reset: 
“A tuition reset is a substantial reduction in a college’s published tuition price—
what people generally think of as its ‘sticker price’ before scholarships and 
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financial aid are awarded. The price reduction typically applies for students 
enrolled in on-campus undergraduate programs, as opposed to graduate or online-
only programs.”(Lawlor, 2016). Frequently, tuition resets do not have a 
substantial impact on net price (Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015). Tuition resets 
are sometimes referred to as tuition rollbacks. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
J.C. Penney traditionally priced goods at high prices but then provided discounts 
to target middle-class consumers who value both quality and savings. However, with 
increasing competition from low-price department stores (e.g. Walmart, Target) new CEO 
Ron Johnson tried to end coupon discounts and simply offer everyday low prices in 2012. 
The results were disastrous. J.C. Penney experienced a 25% loss of sales and a net loss of 
$985 million due to management’s failure to understand the J.C. Penney customer 
enjoyed the thrill of the hunt for bargains (Aisner, 2013).  
In many ways, private not-for-profit colleges face a similar dilemma (Seltzer, 
2017a). They depend on a high-price and high-discount pricing model but increasingly 
face greater competition from lower-price competitors. Some institutions have found 
resetting their tuition led to increased enrollment. Others found implementing the tuition 
reset strategy to be a mistake and subsequently implemented material price increases 
returning to a high-price and high-discount model. Knowing how price communicates 
value to their consumers is critical to selecting an optimal price strategy in a competitive 
environment where mistakes threaten institutional viability.  
Research Problem 
The pricing model of higher education in the United States is under pressure, 
especially in the private not-for-profit sector (Casamento, 2016). The Obama 
administration introduced a number of initiatives attempting to make college attendance 
more affordable including reducing the rates of tuition increases, reducing student debt 
and encouraging more transparency on behalf of colleges (Lewin, 2013). In 2017 the 
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Chronicle of Higher Education ran an exposé entitled The Tuition Pricing Crisis (Pryor, 
2017). The exposé highlighted concerns of politicians, parents, and industry pundits 
about the high and rising costs of education. It went on to describe a variety of innovative 
approaches colleges and universities are taking to revisit pricing models but concluded 
none of the approaches thus far were entirely satisfactory.  
The dominant pricing model in the private 4-year not-for-profit sector is tuition 
discounting. In conjunction with high sticker prices that traditionally serve as a signal of 
quality (Gilmore, 1990), deep discounts are provided to students. The discounts take the 
form of institutional scholarships and grants targeted to attract students distinguished by 
desirable attributes such as academic merit, athletic ability, or other characteristics used 
to shape a class. Discounts are intended to increase the number of students enrolled by 
reducing the net price actually paid by the targeted group (Duffy, 2014; Rine, 2016). 
Tuition discounts enable colleges to target specific subpopulations of students by 
providing scholarships that meet specific criteria (Duffy, 2014; Ehrenberg, 2000). 
Despite these benefits, tuition discounting has also been linked to several negative 
effects. These risks include publishing an artificially inflated direct cost of attendance 
(Rine, 2016) which mask the true price of attendance, also known as net price. Masking 
the net price of attendance can discourage families from applying (Davis, 2003; 
SallieMae & Ipsos Public Affairs, 2015). High unfunded discount rates can weaken 
college budgets (Davis, 2003; Deegan & Deegan, Jr., 2014) and increase the financial 
risk of recruitment strategy failure when insufficient numbers of students are recruited to 
pay for unfunded discounts (Behaunek, 2015; Davis, 2003; Rine, 2016).  
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Excessive pressures to increase discount rates can lead to a tragedy of the 
commons problem, a situation where competition deteriorates the health of a competitive 
environment (Hardin, 1998). On the one hand colleges and universities feel compelled to 
offer ever-higher scholarships and discounts to attract students. NACBUO reported the 
national average discount rate for first-year students was 52.2% during the 2018-2019 
fiscal year (Valbrun, 2019). On the other hand, many chief financial officers in higher 
education wonder if the financial model of their institutions remains viable given the run 
of increasing discount rates over the past two decades (Lederman & Seltzer, 2017; 
NACUBO, 2016; Rine, 2016), combined with projected declines in the population of 
college-going high school seniors (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 
2016). 
More and more colleges and universities are considering a tuition reset strategy 
(Bernard, 2019; Kantrowitz, 2019), up to 20% of private not-for-profit institutions 
according to one prominent survey (Pryor, 2017). Within the 2017-2018 academic year 
alone, 24 colleges announced plans to reduce tuition for the 2018-2019 academic year 
(See Appendix A). Typically, tuition resets are executed as a reduction of the published 
sticker price, but with a roughly commensurate reduction in financial aid such that the net 
price students pay remains basically the same (Bernard, 2019).  
The practical effects of a tuition reset are the subject of ongoing industry debate 
(Seltzer, 2017a). Proponents argue tuition resets can make college more affordable and 
are more transparent because the difference between published sticker price and what 
students actually pay is reduced (Lapovsky, 2015; Toppo, 2019). Critics, however, 
question if tuition resets are merely marketing gimmicks without long-term benefit to the 
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institution or student (Bloom, 2017; Eldridge & Cawley, 2017; Seltzer, 2017a). Indeed, 
some students have ended up paying a higher net price as a result of the tuition reset 
(Krupnick, 2016). Newton observes the results of tuition resets have been uneven at best, 
on the basis that higher education shoppers make their decisions primarily upon value-
shopping (2019). 
The study of tuition resets contributes to a wider body of literature regarding 
theories of price signaling in service industries under deteriorating conditions. In 
situations where potential customers depend upon extrinsic factors to assess the quality of 
an offering, price provides an important signal of quality (Nagle et al., 2011; Simon, 
2015; Utaka, 2015; Zeithaml, 1988). However, price also represents the monetary portion 
of sacrifice in order to enjoy the benefits of using an offering (Nagle et al., 2011; Rao, 
2010; Zeithaml, 1988). In the world of higher education, higher prices have generally 
been associated with higher quality, (Archibald & Feldman, 2011; Ehrenberg, 2000; 
Wright, 2015) but discussions increasingly emphasize cost-related issues such as 
affordability, accessibility, and problems associated with student debt.  
Institutions considering a tuition reset must navigate a series of paradoxes. As a 
signal of quality, lowering the sticker price should not give prospective students an 
impression of lower quality. Further, potential new students and their families need to 
perceive the institution’s offerings are more affordable even as the net price which signals 
fiscal cost remains the same. 
Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between sticker price 
sensitivity and changes in first-year student enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from 
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first-year students, the proportion of first-year students who are Pell-eligible, and transfer 
student enrollment following a tuition reset. In our multivariate logistic and linear 
regression models the independent variable of interest is sticker price sensitivity as 
measured by the sticker price elasticity of demand (Bradley & Singell Jr., 2010; Farhan, 
2016) in the two years prior to the announcement of the reset event. The dependent 
variables stemming from industry dialog (Bloom, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 
2015) are percent change in first-year students enrolled, percent change in net tuition and 
fee revenue from first-year students, change in percent of the first-year cohort that is Pell-
eligible, percent change in transfer students enrolled, likelihood the tuition reset will 
increase first-year enrolled, and likelihood the tuition reset will increase net tuition and 
fee revenue from first-year students. The effects of increased spending on advertising, 
population density, and varied measures of fiscal health are introduced as intervening 
variables (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Kumar, 
2005; Lapovsky, 2015).  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
In service industries such as higher education, price can play two communication 
roles, both as an indicator of quality and as an indicator of cost. As an industry matures or 
transitions to decline, consumers may respond to price messages in different ways. In the 
higher education market, sticker price elasticity and net price elasticity are different 
considerations. Tuition resets offer a unique lens by which responses to changes in both 
sticker price and net price can be investigated. The following literature review funnels 
from broad topics of price theory, to the general context of higher education, and then 
drills-in to the specific phenomenon of tuition resets. The literature review aims to set the 
context for examining price elasticity as a predictor of success for tuition resets. 
Price as Signal of Quality or Sacrifice 
In competitively mature or declining markets, price strategy works to both create 
and harvest value (Simon, 2015). Valerie Zeithaml (1988) argues that consumers perceive 
value by comparing perceptions of benefit (what will they receive in both monetary and 
non-monetary terms) to perceptions of cost (what will they have to give up in both 
monetary and non-monetary terms). When perceptions of benefit are high and 
perceptions of cost are low, consumers perceive high value and are more willing to 
purchase. The role of price in shaping these perceptions is a function of both industry and 
consumer characteristics. 
As a service industry, traditional colleges and universities need to overcome the 
challenges of intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability, and perishability (Lovelock & 
Gummesson, 2004; Wirtz & Lovelock, 2016) to increase perceptions of value. The 
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education process itself is intangible in that it is an exercise of mental stimulation. It is 
heterogeneous in that each student will learn and gain differently, even if given the same 
experience. Traditional classroom experiences are inseparable, meaning the experience of 
teaching and learning cannot be separated from the process of learning. Finally, 
traditional education is perishable in that it cannot be stored (Wirtz & Lovelock, 2016).  
Customer characteristics are also a critical consideration for understanding how 
prices are understood, specifically knowledge of price, purchase characteristics, 
perceived fairness and value components (Rao, 2010). When customers lack price 
knowledge, they become more dependent upon outside cues to estimate what others are 
paying, and what they should expect to pay for a service. Characteristics of the purchase 
may also enhance or reduce price sensitivity. Students who want to enroll at a prestigious 
university might be willing to pay a premium for advance consideration. Perceived 
fairness can become a concern if segments of students come to believe others are 
receiving a better deal. Establishing clear price fences and transparency in pricing can 
help address concerns about fairness (Nagle et al., 2011). Finally, it is critical for colleges 
and universities to deeply understand the variety of value components their offerings 
represent to prospective students. Value components can be functional (e.g. a credential), 
financial (e.g. lowest price), social (e.g. the prestige of having earned a degree at a well-
regarded institution) and psychological (the self-rewarding value of learning in itself). 
Prospective students are highly dependent upon quality signals or cues to 
establish perceptions of benefit (Rao, 2010) given the nature of higher education as a 
credence good. Customers cannot fully access or understand the offering until they 
consume it. Therefore, they become reliant upon other “clues” or “signals” to infer the 
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quality of the offering (Nagle et al., 2011). While the education itself is intangible, its 
quality is inferred in part by physical manifestations such as the condition of the physical 
campus facilities, feelings the customer gets by interacting with recruitment staff, 
reputation and rankings from third-party services, and most importantly for the discussion 
at hand: price (Luca & Smith, 2013).  
Insofar as the price can be used by uninitiated buyers as a signal to quality, a 
higher sticker price can create perceptions of value. A high price itself can create a 
perception of quality and willingness to pay, a notion called Chivas Regal effect which 
has been dominant in higher education pricing models (Askin & Bothner, 2016; Quigley 
et al., 2000). Thorstein Veblen observed that in luxury good markets high prices created 
barriers which in turn created a positive sense of exclusivity (Breaking Down Finance, 
2019). In higher education marketing, high prices work to stimulate demand by 
communicating a sense of prestige and quality (Turner, 2011). 
Research in consumer goods provides a theoretical basis for understanding the 
relationship of price to perceptions of quality. Shirai (2014) found high-quality low-price 
appeals created negative perceptions when offered in the context of other high-priced 
offerings. However, when offered in a context with other low-price offerings, it generated 
positive impressions. This suggests that colleges with favorable rankings compared to 
higher price peers might be well served to sustain high sticker prices to preserve 
favorable perceptions.  
  However, the price also represents a cost to consumers, a sense that sacrifice is 
required to access the benefits of an offering (Chang et al., 2015; Zeithaml, 1988). From 
the perspective of the supplier, the goal of value signaling is to decrease sensitivity (move 
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towards price inelastic behavior). Recent research on college pricing suggests the ways 
high sticker prices are interpreted may change over time; a higher sticker price may 
signal higher quality sometimes, but also may signal higher cost and thereby discourage 
enrollment (Fincher & Katsinas, 2017). More and more prospective students rule out a 
college choice based on sticker price alone. According to SallieMae & Ipsos Public 
Affairs, in 2015, 50% of students eliminated a college choice based on cost alone prior to 
applying. By 2018 the figure grew to 70% (SallieMae & Ipsos Public Affairs, 2015, 
2018). Beyond enrollment of new students, tuition increases not matched by increases in 
financial aid for current students may result in student attrition, and thus revenue loss 
(Bryan & Whipple, 1995). 
Previous studies of price elasticity in the higher education market have found that 
market enrollment demand overall is relatively inelastic with regards to the sticker price 
tuition increases (Gallet, 2017; Tellis, 1988). However, price response behavior varies 
based on individual student characteristics (e.g. level of student, demographic factors) 
(Carter & Curry, 2011) and by types of education delivery. Upperclassmen have lower 
elasticity coefficients than underclassmen as they risk losing credit should they decide to 
transfer (Bryan & Whipple, 1995). A study of Morehouse College, a historically black 
college for men, found that demand for course-hour enrollment was price inelastic but 
income elastic which favors a high tuition and high discount model (Price & Sheftall, 
2015).  
 Another study, Bradley et al (2010) looks at the difference between sticker price and 
net price elasticities in the higher education context. The researchers found students were 
relatively inelastic with regards to sticker price, but more elastic with regards to net price. 
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However, behavior varied between different levels of financial need. High price and high 
discount scenarios encouraged enrollments of lower-income students, and low discount 
models which raised net price discouraged their enrollment. Such behavior is consistent 
with findings in student choice modeling performed by market research firms, such as 
Ruffalo Noel Levitz, that perform price sensitivity studies. Frequently, the negative 
influence of increasing tuition and fees on willingness to enroll is less than the positive 
influence of increasing financial aid by the same amount—which ultimately brings the 
prospective student to a final consideration of net price (S. Bodfish, personal 
communication, May 23, 2017). 
Tuition resets provide a natural experiment for researchers of higher education to 
compare the relationship of sticker price elasticity with net price elasticity. In a tuition 
reset, the sticker price (which often signals quality and is expected to increase) is usually 
reduced by a significant amount, but the net price (which signals cost and would also be 
expected to be reduced if sticker price is reduced) typically remains unchanged. In some 
cases, the net price may actually increase as the sticker price decreases (Krupnick, 2016). 
Such changes in price can create a dissonance in the minds of potential students regarding 
what the “right” price should be. 
The interpretation of future prices cannot be independent of current prices since the 
current price serves as a reference point to understand future changes (Dolan & Simon, 
1996; Meehan et al., 2011). When changing prices, it is to the institution’s advantage to 
supply a rationale for the change rather than leave things to the customer’s interpretation. 
A price increase might be more acceptable if it is explained by a commensurate and 
demonstrable increase in quality. In general, customers are willing to pay if what is 
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offered fits their preferences (Davey et al., 2006). A price decrease, which breaks an 
expected pattern of increases, risks signaling reduced value for an offering. 
 To mitigate such perceptions, firms could message some type of “greater price 
transparency” or “cost-savings passed along” appeal. (Dolan & Simon, 1996; Nagle et al., 
2011). In industries that are price inelastic especially, a price reduction could be 
interpreted as a response to increased competition and lead to further erosion of perceived 
value for the firm’s offerings (Foubert et al., 2018; Meehan et al., 2011). Further, price 
cuts can lead to reactive price cuts by competitors (Dolan & Simon, 1996) and run the 
risk of triggering expensive price wars, which may result in erosion of overall market 
value (Smith, 2017).  
Bodfish (personal communication, May 23, 2017), Casamento (2016), Lapovsky 
(2015, 2019) and Lawlor (2016) emphasize the need for the execution of extensive 
marketing campaigns to accompany tuition resets to help multiple audiences interpret the 
tuition reset from a value perspective, including websites, email campaigns, press 
releases, and town-hall-style meetings for Q&A. Common messaging included emphasis 
on cost reduction to some students, pricing transparency, and consistency in quality.  
Higher Education Moving to Greater Price Competition 
The goals of an institutional price strategy reflect industry conditions and 
characteristics. In mature or declining industries, the competitor set and competing 
products are defined more clearly. Price-based competition is intensified as consumers 
lose a sense that products are differentiated, and capacity exceeds demand. The problem 
of over-capacity is especially acute if exit barriers are significant (Meehan et al., 2011; 
Nagle et al., 2011; Porter, 1998b). Toxic markets emerge where price competition 
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becomes so severe that firms compete at prices lower than the costs of production (Porter, 
1998a). 
Traditional higher education markets reflect many industry characteristics of 
mature and declining markets. According to the National Clearinghouse Research Center, 
overall college enrollments have declined for the sixth consecutive year, and are expected 
to continue to decline in the foreseeable future (Fain, 2017). The 4-year private not-for-
profit sector—the sector where many tuition resets are occurring—has experienced 
negative growth in five of the most recent seven years (National Student Clearinghouse 
Research Center, 2017). In December 2017, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded the 
higher education sector from “stable” to “negative” (Harris, 2017). The negative ratings 
continued throughout 2019 due to constrained tuition revenue (Osborn & Fitzgerald, 
2019). Due to delays in having children during the Great Recession starting in 2008, the 
number of college-bound high school graduates could decline by a staggering 15% by the 
mid-2020s according to WICHE data (Jaschik, 2018; Western Interstate Commission for 
Higher Education, 2016) further exacerbating current enrollment declines, especially in 
the northeast.  
As enrollment declines continue, the market is undergoing structural changes to 
reduce over-capacity. Many higher education theorists such as Clayton M. Christensen 
predict mass closures and mergers among small, non-elite, and private colleges with the 
rise of online learning and other new innovative educational models (Christensen & 
Eyring, 2011; Poole, 2017). Such predictions seem to be coming to fruition as mergers 
and closures are becoming increasingly frequent (Fernandez, 2017; Woodhouse, 2015). 
Websites are emerging among industry news firms to track the number and reasons for 
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college closures and mergers (Bauman & O’Leary, 2019; Education Dive Staff, 2019; 
Jaschik, 2019). 
However, significant exit barriers exist within higher education slowing the 
correction of over-capacity. Per accreditation standards, colleges must form plans for 
current students. Mergers and college closures are becoming more frequent—roughly five 
annually on average (Woodhouse, 2015). The mergers and closures are expected to 
increase in frequency. Members of the college community may resist the closure process. 
In an interesting case, Sweet Briar College, a prestigious women’s college, sought to 
close in 2015 due to increasing discount rates and diminishing enrollments. However, 
loyal alumni fought to restart the college. As of 2017, enrollments are in decline 
again(Seltzer, 2017b). Similarly, Montreat College was on the verge of closure but 
received major philanthropic support (Ball, 2016) and has been attempting to rebuild over 
the last three years. 
In mature markets, competitive forces act to reduce the differentiation between 
purchase options (Smith, 2017). In other words, there is pressure to “commoditize” 
offerings. In higher education, commoditization assumes at least two significant forms. 
First, there is an explosion of rating and ranking systems that facilitate easy comparison 
between presumably similar options, thereby creating a sense of interchangeability 
between options. The U.S. News & World Report, one of the most well-known among 
many rankings, ranks colleges within categories based on their Carnegie Classification. 
The criteria used include reputation, the academic profile of incoming students, retention 
and graduation rates, and financial strength (Morse et al., 2016). New rankings have also 
emerged within the last ten years which emphasize the financial pay-out of college 
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including Payscale.com (Payscale, 2017), Money Magazine (Clark, 2016), and Forbes 
(Coudriet, 2018). The Department of Education developed a college ranking system 
under the Obama administration. However, after protracted discussion with higher 
education leaders, the Department of Education settled on a College Scorecard system, 
wherein key statistics about cost, retention, and employment outcomes are listed (DoE 
Press Office, 2016).  
Students are increasingly unbundling their education experience; it can no longer 
be assumed that the pursuit of a degree will be a singular four-year course of study at a 
single institution (Selingo, 2013). Increasingly, students earn credits from multiple 
institutions to complete their degree, a process referred to as student swirl (Selingo, 
2013). Underlying the approach is the assumption that courses between institutions are 
interchangeable and credits can be transferred to the institution of record without a 
substantive degradation in the quality of overall education received (Borden, 2004; 
Christensen & Eyring, 2011).  
Another factor contributing to the decline in enrollment in traditional colleges is 
increasing receptivity to alternative forms of online instruction and nontraditional 
credentialing for skills development among employers (Farrington, 2014; Selingo, 2013). 
New forms of life-preparation such as online degree completion allow for more self-
paced learning. Apprenticeships allow students to learn hands-on trades (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 2018; Varetto, 2017) and earn credit for life-learning in a system known as 
competency-based assessment (Gruppen et al., 2016). In many technical fields, online 
“badges” can be accrued which certify mastery of some specific skills or areas 
(Muilenburg & Berge, 2016). Each of these alternatives diverts the number of students 
Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success 15 
that otherwise would have considered the 4-year traditional colleges and offers their own 
unique competing value propositions (Kirst & Stevens, 2015; Selingo, 2013). 
Higher education has also long been an industry with significant information 
asymmetry. The suppliers (e.g. colleges and universities) collect information about the 
potential consumers and determine the price to be paid (via determination of financial aid 
offers contingent upon family income, student academic profile, student fit for other 
desired attributes). Such information asymmetry has traditionally allowed colleges and 
universities to utilize revenue management practices which price discriminate based on 
desired enrollment goals and applicant profiles (Rebbapragada et al., 2010). However, the 
increase of consumer information revealing net price paid, debt levels of graduates, and 
graduation rates dramatically reduces the information asymmetry. 
Given the compounding effect of these deteriorating market conditions—reduced 
differentiation, an increasing number of alternatives, decreased information asymmetry 
and excess capacity—the influence of buyers’ bargaining power is increased. Under these 
conditions, price strategy becomes a more critical and competitive factor as it becomes 
the basis for the buyer’s final decision. The most visible evidence of increasing buyer-
power is the increase of discounts—in the form of institutional scholarship and grant 
aid—that colleges and universities offer to students to entice enrollment. According to the 
2018 Tuition Discounting Study performed annually by NACUBO, the First-Time, Full-
Time Freshman discount rate reached an all-time high of 52.2% in Fall 2018. This is up 
12.3 percentage points from 39.9% from ten years ago, with more than 1.2 percentage 
points increase per year (NACUBO, 2019; Valbrun, 2019). In other words, while the 
sticker price of colleges and universities has continued to increase significantly, the 
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revenue received by the college on a per-student basis has only increased marginally 
(Newton, 2019). Many researchers perceive the increase in discounting as an 
unsustainable phenomenon (Behaunek, 2015; Davis, 2003; Rine, 2016) which can lead to 
market toxicity wherein offerings are sold at prices lower than the cost to provide (Porter, 
1998b). 
The Tuition Reset Strategy  
Pricing in higher education raises a series of complex financial and marketing 
concerns. The sticker price is the published price for tuition, fees, room, and board. 
Colleges award scholarship and grant aid to discount the sticker price, resulting in a 
lower net price. Discount rate is the percentage of tuition and fees given back in the form 
of institutional discounts (NACUBO, 2019; Ruffalo Noel Levitz, 2017). During the first 
year of attendance, the amount of institutional scholarship and grant aid awarded is set 
for each student. In later years, tuition and fees increase, but the institutional scholarship 
and grant awards usually do not change except in cases of demonstrable changes in 
family income. Therefore, the discount rates are usually higher for first-year students than 
returning students who pay more from annual rate increases (Ehrenberg, 2000). 
Against the general trend of rising sticker prices to attend college, tuition resets 
(also known as tuition reductions or tuition rollbacks) lower the published sticker price of 
tuition and fees, but also make reductions to institutional grants and scholarships to 
accomplish approximately the same net price (Bernard, 2019; Lapovsky, 2015). Such a 
change has several important financial implications:  
 Only students who are full-paying—or close to full-paying—will realize savings 
by the amount of the tuition reduction (or the difference between the amount of 
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the tuition reduction and the aid they received) (S. Bodfish, personal 
communication, May 23, 2017; L. Lapovsky, personal communication, March 1, 
2016). The resulting loss of revenue can be expensive to the institution when the 
number of current students who have low discount rates is considered (Lapovsky, 
2015).  
 To break-even financially, tuition resets need to enroll large enough quantities of 
new students to cover the loss of revenue from both new and continuing students 
who would have been full—or nearly full—paying (S. Bodfish, personal 
communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015). If an 
institution has many near-full-pay or full-pay students, a tuition reset is unlikely 
to break even. 
 Students receiving institutional grants at the same amount (or greater) than the 
tuition reset amount will pay approximately the same net price (S. Bodfish, 
personal communication, May 23, 2017; Lapovsky, 2015).  
 Because the aid current students receive will be reduced commensurate to the 
tuition reduction amount, funded aid dollars can be freed to meet a higher 
percentage of need and for more students (S. Bodfish, personal communication, 
May 23, 2017). Net tuition revenues from these students will remain about the 
same.  
 The institution’s ability to meet need from funded institutional grant aid sources is 
increased because the calculated need for students is reduced by the tuition 
reduction amount, aiding long term financial stability (Browning, 2013; Martin, 
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2004). Because funded grant aid goes further, institutions reduce reliance on 
unfunded grant aid. 
 Institutions reduce their NACUBO Discount Rate which is viewed as positive 
from the perspective of potential creditors.  
Tuition resets also represent a significant marketing opportunity to reposition the 
institution among its peers (Lawlor, 2016). Because 70% of students report eliminating 
colleges as an option on the basis of cost alone prior to applying (SallieMae & Ipsos 
Public Affairs, 2018), institutions that implement tuition resets hope to significantly 
expand the number of prospective students who would consider applying to their 
institution. Frequently, a significant promotional campaign effort is launched to create 
awareness of the price change, explain how it will benefit students, and seek to reposition 
the institution among its constellation of competitors (S. Bodfish, personal 
communication, May 23, 2017; L. Lapovsky, personal communication, March 1, 2016; 
Lawlor, 2016). 
In summary, to be successful from a financial perspective, a tuition reset should 
attract enough students so that the cost of the reset—in terms of promotional costs and 
lost incremental revenues from full-paying and low-discount-rate returning students—is 
covered by a higher volume of new students enrolled. To be successful from a marketing 
perspective, institutions need to make students believe the quality of education they will 
be receiving is the same as or better than that prior to the reset, and the price they will be 
paying is “fair” (Bodfish, 2017). 
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Research Questions  
Tuition resets offer a natural experiment to assess the impact of sticker price 
elasticity on several facets of enrollment behavior. This study will address the following 
research questions: 
1. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in first-year student enrollment 
for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
2. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net tuition and fee revenue 
from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
3. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student enrollment for institutions 
implementing a tuition reset? 
4. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year 
students for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
5. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in the proportion of first-year Pell-eligible student 
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
6. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student enrollment for institutions 
implementing a tuition reset? 
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As discussed in the literature review, many practitioners emphasize the role of 
advertising in successfully implementing a tuition reset. For each of the above research 
questions, this study also examines the intervening effects of a change in advertising 
spending. 
Additional considerations will also be explored such as whether the size of a 
tuition reduction influences results, influence on transfer student enrollment, and the 
influence of a reset on retention. We will also consider if resets following the 2010 Great 
Recession were more successful than those preceding it.  
Significance of the Study 
This research makes several important contributions to the literature: 
Tuition resets are happening more often. Between 1995 and 2005, 22 institutions 
announced a tuition reset. Between 2005-2015, 66 institutions announced tuition resets (a 
300% increase). In only the three years between 2015 and 2018, 36 institutions 
announced tuition resets. While the effectiveness of tuition resets is still a matter for 
discussion and research, clearly a growing number of institutions are willing to consider 
the reset strategy. 
There are few academic studies on the tuition reset strategy, despite increasing 
attention in news and media. Academic and privately funded studies focused on 
qualitative methods such as multiple case studies. Important multiple case studies 
include: 
 Lucie Lapovsky’s (2015) multiple-case study Tuition Reset: An Analysis of Eight 
Colleges that Addressed the Escalating Price of Higher Education continues to be 
cited in news articles frequently and was funded by the Lumina Foundation.  
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 Laura Casamento’s (2016) dissertation, A Multiple Case Study Analysis Exploring 
How Less Selective, Tuition-Dependent Colleges and Universities Approached an 
Undergraduate Tuition Price Reset Strategy provides further case study analysis.  
 Eldridge and Cawley (2017) described the experience of planning for a tuition 
reset and how Rosemont College interpreted the results in Beyond the headlines: 
the mechanics of a tuition reset.  
More recently a few researchers are also studying resets using quantitative methods: 
 Alex Bloom (2017) of Education Advisory Board reported the results of a study 
of 27 institutions in a blog post entitled Appealing but ineffective: Why tuition 
resets aren't consistently successful and found that tuition resets were not 
consistently successful.  
 Sarah Kottich’s dissertation Tuition Reductions: A Quantitative Analysis of the 
Prevalence, Circumstances and Outcomes of an Emerging Pricing Strategy in 
Higher Education assessed a range of effects of tuition resets implemented by 45 
institutions (2017).  
 Lucie Lapovski, Kottich’s dissertation advisor, then released a quantitative study 
(2019) of tuition reset results. 
To the best of this author’s knowledge, this study of 72 institutions regarding the 
impact and financial implications of tuition resets is the largest and most comprehensive 
quantitative analysis to date.  
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This study provides a new quantitative lens for understanding tuition resets. The 
preliminary results section supplies a valuable characterization of results that institutions 
implementing tuition resets have realized through descriptive statistics. Further, 
combining elements of the event-study methodology from finance with the variety of 
variables from IPEDS, the impact of tuition resets on a host of institutional factors can be 
explored in subsequent studies such as change in academic profile of students that apply, 
changes in ethnic composition of first-year students, 4-year graduation rates (as an 
indicator of college completion), changes in indicators of institutional financial health, 
and many others. 
This study extends literature about the effects of price as a quality signal in 
service industries. Tuition resets offer a natural experiment by which researchers can 
contrast the influence of sticker price and net price on a purchase decision. Because 
tuition resets change the sticker price and while net price remains substantially the same, 
the signaling impact of sticker price changes can be statistically tested using a series of 
important outcome variables such as application generation, admitted students, enrolled 
students, and revenue from first-year students. 
This study also makes important contributions to practice. Industry practitioners 
are asking many important questions about the outcomes and implications of a tuition 
reset. This study supplies baseline information that addresses the scale and breadth of 
outcomes experienced by institutions implementing tuition resets. 
Especially important from the practitioner perspective, the study also addresses 
prediction questions. Building on the general question of what happens when institutions 
reset their tuition, recruitment managers need to assess the suitability and effectiveness of 
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the tuition resetting strategy for their specific institution. Predictive models created in this 
study can help practitioners understand potential outcomes and the drivers of different 
potential outcomes for specific institutions, within the constraints of the model accuracy 
and predictive power.  
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
As discussed in earlier chapters, in service industries such as higher education, 
price can play two roles; both as an indicator of quality and as an indicator of cost. But as 
industries mature or transition to decline, consumers may respond to price messages in 
different ways. In the higher education market, researchers can model sticker price 
elasticities and net price elasticities separately. Tuition resets offer a natural experiment 
through which the influence of sticker price alone on facets of enrollment behavior can be 
better understood.  
This chapter describes the methods used to test the research problems identified in 
the previous chapters. First, a rationale for borrowing from the event-study methodology 
will be provided, and a detailed description of how it can be adapted to the process of a 
tuition reset implementation. Second, the process of selecting participants and gathering 
data is described. Third, the variables for observation are described. Fourth, detailed 
procedures are described for gathering, cleaning, and analyzing the data will be 
described. Finally, the methods of data analysis are detailed. 
Research Design and Rationale 
This study borrows elements from the event study methodology but is not a true 
event study in that there is no comparison with institutions that have not reset. A tuition 
reset usually is a specific one-time event, unlike tuition discounting which involves an 
ongoing annual process of defining discounting goals. Typically—although there are 
exceptions—an institution operates at a “high price/high discount,” performs the reset, 
and in subsequent years resumes the annual cycle of setting prices with discounts. As 
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discrete one-time occurrences in the life-span of an institution, the event-study 
methodology offers a favorable analytical lens from which to understand both the 
phenomenon of tuition-resets (Boehmer, 1991), but also to highlight the role sticker price 
elasticity plays in impacting varied dependent variables such as first-year enrollment, net 
tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, and changes in the percentage of Pell-
eligible first-year students.  
Born from the discipline of finance to analyze the impact of stock splits, event 
studies involve the comparison of statistically modeled firm performance prior to a 
specific event—such as the announcement of a tuition reset—with the performance 
following (MacKinlay, 1997). The event study methodology has been extended to other 
fields, including marketing, to better understand the financial impact of different potential 
actions on firms (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Skiera et al., 2017; Sorescu et al., 2017).  
To apply elements of the event-study methodology to the phenomenon of tuition 
resets, a conceptual timeline was developed (See Table 1 below) to emulate how the 
process of a tuition reset unfolds (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017):  
Table 1 
Conceptual model for tuition reset timeline and variable calculation 
Relative Year Definition Management Events 
-3 Three years prior to the reset No change.  
-2 Two years prior to the reset No Change 
-1 One year prior to the reset FY Enrolled reflect old student charge 
structure, however, tuition reset is 
formally announced.  
0 First-year at new lower sticker 
price in effect 
Recruitment results reflect the 
understanding of the new reset price 
structure. 
Note: Most colleges run on a July to June fiscal year system. Therefore, relative years split 
calendar years.  
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While tuition resets occurred during different years for different institutions, a 
uniform model that standardizes events and measures to a relative timeline is needed. 
Price elasticities are assessed based on price and first-year student enrollments between 
years -3 and -1. This approximates the timing needed to complete decisions about 
whether to proceed with a tuition reset. Recruitment results of the reset are assessed in 
Year 0 where the first cohort of first-year students aware of the new reset price structure 
enrolls.  
Data analysis will employ binary logistic and linear regression methods, both of 
which are quantitative (Chapman & Feit, 2015; Field, 2013; Salkind, 2017). 
Implementing a tuition reset strategy involves an assessment of risk to practitioners. 
Research questions 1 and 2 (R1 and R2) pertain to how independent variables influence 
the likelihood of a specified outcome (more students or more net revenue from first-year 
students). Binary logistic regression is used to identify the influence of independent 
variables on the log-likelihood of a Boolean event (the dependent variable) occurring 
(Chapman & Feit, 2015). The results of logistic regression can be used to give 
probabilities of a successful outcome on an institutional basis. 
Research questions 3, 4, 5, and 6 (R3, R4, R5, and R6) pertain to the influence of 
independent variables on levels of an independent variable. Linear regression is used to 
quantify the influence of one or more independent variables on levels of an independent 
variable (Berenson et al., 1992; Salkind, 2017). Where this discussion focuses on the 
influence of sticker price elasticity, other variables—as discussed in the literature and as 
mentioned by industry experts—are included in models to increase their statistical power.  
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Participants and Sampling 
As of 2016, there were 1,594 4-year private not-for-profit colleges as recognized 
by the National Center for Education Statistics (2018), a relatively well-defined industry 
sector. Tuition resets are a contrarian phenomenon which depends, in part, on highly 
publicized announcements of price reductions to attract attention (Lapovsky, 2015; 
Lawlor, 2016).  
To develop the analysis dataset, multiple methods of ‘discovering’ tuition reset 
institutions were used. I interviewed Scott Bodfish, Vice President of Market Research at 
Ruffalo Noel Levitz (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017) who provided 
a list of institutions he was familiar with that had implemented tuition resets. I conducted 
internet searches to reveal lists of institutions that implemented tuition resets or identify 
institutions themselves. The major lists found included Affordable Schools.net 
(Affordable Schools, 2017), Cappex (Kantrowitz, 2017), Edvisors (Edvisors, 2017), 
Education Dive (Shumski, 2014), NAICU (National Association of Independent Colleges 
and Universities, 2017) and more recently Savingforcollege.com (Kantrowitz, 2019). I 
reached out to Alex Bloom of EAB (2017) via telephone discussion to compare the list I 
had compiled at that point to his. I set up Google Alerts to provide notifications when 
items were published to the web with the phrases “tuition reset” or “tuition cut.” To 
further increase the validity of the institution list, news articles and institutional website 
announcements were collected to document tuition resets that were the result of specific 
intentional marketing efforts, and not attributed to other causes (e.g. institutional mergers, 
negotiations with state legislatures). Finally, I reviewed and compared institutions on my 
list to those listed in the appendix of Sarah Kottich’s dissertation (2017). 
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To the researcher’s knowledge, the resulting list of 142 institutions which 
announced tuition resets is the most comprehensive list yet compiled, and the sample size 
represents an overwhelming majority of the total population of institutions that have 
implemented tuition resets for the period under observation (July 1997 to July 2018). At 
present, there are 72 private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions for which enough 
information is available to perform data analysis. Of this 72, 43 have advertising and 
promotion expenditure information. 
After compiling the list of institutions, the tuition resets were verified by 
identifying web pages with public news announcements of the tuition reset, tuition reset 
announcement microsites hosted within institutional websites. Further, IPEDS data was 
pulled for student charges to ensure the tuition and fee reductions reported were realized 
in regulatory reporting. Sarah Kottich (2017) identified a list of institutions that initially 
appeared to have conducted tuition resets, but disqualified them due to extenuating 
circumstances. These institutions are also excluded.  
Measures 
This research will focus on the impact of sticker price elasticity on several facets 
of enrollment behavior. A broad set of data points was developed to strengthen the 
explanatory power of models developed in support of the research questions. Because 
this study uses publicly available data sources (IPEDS, IRS, U.S. Census Bureau), 
industry-standard definitions are assumed. Refer to Appendix B for a comprehensive list 
of variable definitions used in this study, data sources, and official definitions according 
to the sources.  
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 Drawing from this broader set of measures, it is appropriate to highlight a few of 
the more important measures directly referenced in the research questions: 
 Sticker price elasticity (or PED_Sticker) measures price elasticity using changes 
in first-year students enrolling as a measure of demand quantity and sticker price 
as the measure of price change. 
 Transfer sticker price elasticity (or PED_Sticker_XFR) measures price elasticity 
using changes in transfer students enrolling as a measure of demand quantity and 
sticker price as the measure of price change. 
 First-year student enrollment change percent (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) is the percent 
change in the number of first-time students enrolled between the year prior to and 
during the first year of the reset. First-time students enrolled (Enrolled_Y0) refers 
to the number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who 
applied, were admitted and enrolled (full- or part-time) at an institution for the 
most recent fall period available. These include early decision, early action, and 
students who began studies during the summer prior to that fall during the year of 
a tuition reset (NCES National Center for Education Statistics, 2017). 
 Reset success by enrollment (Reset_Success_Enrollment) is a categorical 
variable that indicates if the tuition reset resulted in a five percent or greater 
increase in first-time student enrollment relative to the year prior. If there was a 
five percent or greater increase this measure would be true, otherwise, it is false. 
A five percent increase in one year marks a material increase in first-year student 
enrollment. 
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 Net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students (FY_Net_Revenue_Y0) is the 
average net price times the number of first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_Y0) 
 Net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students’ percent change 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) is the percent change between Y-1 and Y0 in 
net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students. 
 Reset success by first-year net revenue (Reset_Success_NetRevenue) is a 
categorical variable that indicates if the tuition reset resulted in five percent or 
more dollars of net revenue from first-year students relative to the year prior. If 
there was five percent net revenue or more, this measure would be true, otherwise 
is false. A five percent increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year 
students in one year marks a material increase. 
 Difference in percent Pell (PercentPell_CHG) is the percentage difference in Pell-
eligible students between the year prior to the reset (PercentPell_YearPrior) and 
during the first-year at the new lower price (PercentPell_Y0).  
 Retention change (Retention_CHG) is the difference in first-year student retention 
rates between Y-1 and Y0. 
It is also appropriate to include financial ratios—used to assess aspects of the 
financial health of colleges and universities—as independent variables prior to the reset 
given their prominence in many discussions found in the literature. Many practitioners 
emphasize the need for colleges to be financially vital prior to undertaking a tuition reset 
(S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2019; 
Lawlor, 2016). KPMG’s Composite Financial Index (CFI) is a summary measure of an 
institution’s financial health based on four ratios (Pelletier, 2015). These ratios have also 
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been adapted by the Austen Group’s Financial Indicators Tool (FIT) and are widely 
known by higher education finance professionals: 
 Primary reserve ratio—also known as the operating reserve ratio in FIT—
(Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior) explores whether an institution’s resources 
are enough and flexible or liquid enough to support its mission. 
 Net operating revenues ratio—also known as the operating margin ratio in FIT— 
(Operating_Margin_Ratio_YearPrior) looks at whether operating results show that 
the institution is living within its available resources. 
 Return on net position ratio—also known as the change in net assets ratio in 
FIT— (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) examines how well the 
institution’s asset performance and management support its strategic direction. 
 Viability Ratio (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior) assesses how strategically the 
institution’s financial resources, including debt, are managed to advance the 
institution’s mission. 
 While not a part of CFI, the equity ratio (EquityRatio_Y0) is an important 
measure of financial leverage in the year prior to implanting a tuition reset.  
Many practitioners who have written about tuition reset emphasize the need to 
implement a marketing campaign in conjunction with a tuition reset (S. Bodfish, personal 
communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015; Lawlor, 2016). A 
survey of all reset institutions to provide estimates of promotional expenditures specific 
to the tuition reset was considered but ultimately rejected due to the likelihood of a low 
response rate (Dillman et al., 2014) which would net insufficient information to make 
statistically significant observations. Institutional “Advertising and Promotion” 
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expenditures from Form 990 data during the years prior to and during a tuition reset event 
was available for a sub-set (N=43) of the institutions implementing a tuition reset. From 
this data, two measures of advertising were developed: 
 Advertising and promotion spend year prior 
(AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YearPrior) is the dollars spent in advertising and 
promotion expenditures during the year the tuition reset is announced, presumably 
to promote the reset in part. 
 Change in advertising and promotion spend by percentage 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) is the percentage difference in advertising 
expenditures between Year -1 and Year -2. As a percentage, this measure 
normalizes institutions of different sizes. 
Data Collection Procedure 
Approval from George Fox University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) was 
unnecessary due to the use of anonymous panel data. No individual-level data were used 
for analysis. The data set used for analysis combined institution-level information from 
IPEDS, Form 990s, and U.S. Census Data. Appendix B provides a comprehensive list of 
variable definitions used in the analysis, identifies the primary source of data for each 
variable and official definitions according to the source.  
IPEDS 
Colleges and universities participating in the Title IV financial aid program are 
required to provide accurate annual statistical reports to the Department of Education 
through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (or IPEDS) (National 
Center for Educational Statistics, 2017). As a public service, IPEDS data is accessible 
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through the IPEDS Data Center to researchers for download. As pertaining to this study, 
the IPEDS Data Center allows downloading of needed data including institutional 
characteristics, institutional address/location, tuition and fees charged, applications, the 
number of first-year students who enrolled, the number of first-year students who 
received institutional grant aid, and the average amount of institutional grant aid first-
year students received. From these data points, other important ratios can be calculated.  
While this research has identified a list of institutions that have implemented 
tuition resets between 1995 and 2018, the availability of data from IPEDS varies by 
survey component. The IPEDS data review process also precludes publicly publishing 
institutional information for up to two years thus creating lags in the availability of 
information. IPEDS data used in this analysis was harvested through a multi-step process: 
1. A comparison group file was created which contained the OPEID and name of 
every institution on the list of reset institutions (See Appendix A). The OPE ID 
number uniquely identifies each institution in IPEDS to the Office of 
Postsecondary Education (CEDS, 2019; NCES National Center for Education 
Statistics, 2017). 
2. A variable set file was created which captured all variables used in the analysis 
from the IPEDS data center. Variables were selected from the following catalogs 
(or sub-surveys of IPEDS) for as many years as were available: 
o Institutional Characteristics 
o Admissions and Test Scores 
o Student Charges 
o Retention rates, Entering Class, and Student to Faculty Ratio 
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o Student Financial Aid and Net Price 
o Finance 
3. The institutional data was downloaded based on the Institution list and selected 
variables cited in the Variables list using the IPEDS Compare Institutions tool 
(National Center for Educational Statistics, 2019). The downloaded file was a .csv 
which could be opened and manipulated in Excel.  
4. The downloaded IPEDS data was then staged for review. Using the provided data 
dictionary, all numerically coded variables were transformed into their text values 
(e.g. institution types). The columns were sorted so all variables were grouped 
together and placed in a series format by year. All calculated variables based on 
IPEDS data fields were added without error checking so error messages due to 
incomplete data could be clearly identified. 
5. A copy of the raw data was scaffolded to prepare for implementing the event-
study model (described above). A column was added which listed the year of reset 
as it applied to each institution name. A row was added to standardize the fiscal 
year each variable represented (Years in IPEDS Sometimes reference the start of a 
fiscal year, and for other variables reference the end of a fiscal year, and 
sometimes reference both). Institution records were then sorted by institution 
type, and by reset year.  
6. With scaffolding in place, data were checked for completeness and data types: 
o Institutions that were publicized to have implemented resets but did not 
report lower tuition and fees charged to IPEDS were removed from the 
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data set. This happened when program-specific resets rather than 
institution-level resets occurred. 
o Because the scope of this research is private not-for-profit institutions, all 
other colleges were filtered out of the data set. 
o If institutions were missing counts for the variable “Enrolled” but had a 
first-year full-time financial aid cohort, the value of first-year full-time 
financial aid cohort was provided to the variable “Enrolled.”  
o Each row was checked for missing data, and then that data values were of 
the expected data types, and that data were within expected ranges. 
7. A time-series calculation was inserted above each Year of Reset grouping of 
institutions and for each variable set. Year 0 was the first year of the new sticker 
price. Year -3 was three years prior to the new price. Year 3 was the third year 
following the change (or 4th year at the new price). After these time-series 
calculations were inserted, all rows for all variables were realigned horizontally 
from an actual year system to the new relative-year/time-scaled system.  
Form 990 
The Form 990 is roughly analogous to a tax return filed with the IRS to disclose 
sources and uses of funds by a not-for-profit organization (Blazek & Adams, 2009). Most 
public and private colleges and universities are tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue 
Code 501(c)(3) and are therefore required to complete an IRS Form 990 on an annual 
basis (Association of American Universities, 2014; Internal Revenue Service, 2018).  
Financial data for each private not-for-profit institution was drawn from both 
IPEDS and Form 990 information to support the analysis of financial health using the 
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Composite Financial Index (CFI) methodology. The Financial Indicators Tool (FIT) as 
provided by The Austen Group provided detailed calculation instructions to calculate 
these ratios and the CFI based on data from IPEDS and Form 990 data (Chabotar, 2006; 
The Austen Group, 2019a).  
Form 990 information data was acquired through a free academic GuideStar 
Premium subscription to GuideStar by Candid (GuideStar, 2019). Access to this 
subscription required written verification of the goal of this study and approval of the 
George Fox University librarian. 
The following steps were performed to create a financial data analysis file: 
1. A copy of the IPEDS analysis dataset was made following Step 7 above. 
2. All variables were removed, except for all years available of the following: 
o Institution Identifier 
o Institution Name 
o Year of Reset 
o Endowment assets (year-end) per FTE enrollment (FASB) 
o Equity ratio (FASB) 
o Net assets beginning of the year 
o Net assets end of the year 
o Total change in net assets 
o Total expenses 
o Total net assets 
o Debt related to Property Plant and Equipment 
o Total unrestricted net assets - EOY 
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o Temporarily restricted net assets 
o Permanently restricted net assets included in total restricted net assets 
o Property Plant and Equipment net of accumulated depreciation 
o Total Revenue 
3. A time-series calculation was inserted above each Year of Reset grouping of 
institutions and for each variable set. Year 0 was the first year of the new sticker 
price. Year -3 was three years prior to the new price. Year 3 was the third year 
following the price change (or 4th year at the new price). 
4. For each institution, for each year, Form 990 data in GuideStar (which is reported 
to the IRS by an institution’s finance office and has to match an audited Financial 
Statement) was compared to IPEDS finance data (which is reported through 
finance or Institutional Research). To maintain an audit trail of changes, all places 
where Form 990 data over-rode IPEDS data the font color was changed to 
burgundy in the worksheet. 
o Institution names and Employer Identification Numbers (EIN’s) were used 
to ensure a match between specific institutions found in IPEDS and Form 
990 searches. 
o If there were missing data elements in IPEDS data, the Form 990 data was 
supplied. 
o If there were conflicts between IPEDS and Form 990 data, the Form 990 
data would take precedence over the IPEDS data. Form 990 data is 
provided to the IRS and is subject to audit, and therefore under a higher 
level of scrutiny (Blazek & Adams, 2009, p. 990). 
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o If the ending balance of an earlier year conflicted with the starting balance 
of the following year, the following year’s starting balances would take 
precedence over the ending balance of the earlier year on the assumption 
that errors were discovered and corrected. 
5. The “Advertising and Promotion” data elements were added to the analysis sheet 
for three years prior and up to the year of each institution’s tuition reset.  
6. Some data elements (See Appendix B for detailed information) were calculated 
and added including the four KPMG ratios and CFI (both with and without debt 
as according to FIT) as demonstrated in the Appendix of the sample FIT report 
(The Austen Group, 2019b). 
7. Columns were re-aligned horizontally from an actual year system to the relative-
year/time-scaled system. Columns prior to Year -3 and following Year 3 were 
removed. 
8. The finance variables data set was merged with the IPEDS data set by Institution 
ID. 
U.S. Census Population and Geographic data 
Tuition resets represent a strategic opportunity to capture the attention of 
individuals who might not otherwise consider an institution, and more individuals are 
better. With this in mind, industry practitioners have posited institutions with access to 
dense regional populations are better positioned for success (S. Bodfish, personal 
communication, May 23, 2017) since most students attend colleges within a one-day 
drive of their home (Wexlar, 2016). According to CIRP’s American Freshman: National 
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Norms Fall 2017 survey about half (44.9%) of students attending a 4-year private not-for-
profit institution attend within 100 miles or less (2019). 
To introduce the influence of distance, population size, and density to the models, 
geographic and population data provided in IPEDS was supplemented with 2010 U.S. 
Census data (SF3 files) using the Missouri Census Data Center’s Circular Area Profiles 
(CAPS) application (Missouri Census Data Center, 2017). CAPS enables the researcher 
to obtain population estimates and population density estimates within a 100-mile and 
200-mile radius of an institution’s zip code according to 2010 U.S. Census data (the most 
recent census applicable for the significant majority of institutions that have implemented 
a reset). 
Population and population density information were collected as follows: 
1. For each institution, the zip code of the main campus was identified and looked 
up in CAPS (Missouri Census Data Center, 2019). IPEDS provided 
o Institution’s zip code 
o U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Region 
2. The following data points were captured and recorded, directly appending the 
IPEDS data analysis file from Step 8 above: 
o Population in 200 miles 
o Population in 100 miles 
o Population density in 200 miles 
o Population density in 100 miles 
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3. Calculated fields were added to compare the local population (within 100 miles) 
to the more distant population (between 100 and 200 miles) of the zip code where 
the institution is located. 
o Percent of 200 miles population in 100-miles population 
o Ratio of 100 miles density to 200-miles density 
Data Analysis 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between measures of 
sticker price elasticity and the change in first-year student enrollment, change in net 
revenue from first-year students, and change of first-year students who are Pell-eligible 
following a tuition reset using multivariate binary logistic and linear (OLS) regression 
models. The effects of advertising will be explored as an intervening variable. It will add 
to the body of knowledge by characterizing the outcomes of tuition resets and 
investigating the two roles of price as a signal of quality or as a signal of sacrifice.  
Following the completion of data collection, we proceed with the data analysis in 
three phases: 
 Phase 1 provides descriptive statistics.  
 Phase 2 performs binary logistic regression analysis.  
 Phase 3 performs multivariate linear regression analysis.  
 Because advertising data is only available for a subset of institutions, each 
regression in Phase 2 and Phase 3 is performed twice, first without advertising (a 
larger sample) and then with advertising (a smaller sample).  
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Phase 1: Descriptive Analysis Procedure 
In Phase 1, a preliminary analysis will characterize the results of tuition resets 
using descriptive methods such as frequencies and measures of central tendency. The 
results of this analysis will be informative to academics and practitioners seeking to 
understand the frequency and scope of potential outcomes for tuition resets. The 
following frequency tables will be provided through analysis using Microsoft Excel on 
the analysis data set: 
 Number of tuition resets per year, for each year of the period of observation 
 Institutional control of institutions performing tuition resets 
 BEA Statistical regions where tuition resets occur 
 Characteristics of institutions performing a tuition reset 
 Range of outcomes from performing a tuition reset 
Phase 2: Binary Logistic Regression Procedure 
In phase 2, binary logistic regression analysis will be performed in RStudio 
(RStudio, 2019) to explore research questions 1 and 2. Binary logistic regression is a 
statistical method used to predict the log-likelihood of an event occurring for a given 
entity (Hosmer et al., 2013; Lang, 1999). Binary logistic regression assumes the 
dependent variable is dichotomous (UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, 
2019). Pertaining to research question 1, the Reset_Success_Enrollment variable was 
defined to be 1 if 5% or more first-year students were enrolled in the year of the reset, 
and 0 if not. Pertaining to research question 2, the Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue 
variable was defined to be 1 if 5% or more first-year students were enrolled in the year of 
the reset, and 0 if not. The data analysis procedure is as follows employing a purposeful 
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step-up strategy drawing in variables from the larger data set (Bursac et al., 2008; Grace-
Martin, 2014) as described in Appendix B: 
1. Export the Excel-based data collection file into a .csv file. 
2. Run descriptive statistics for each variable and ensure datatypes are detected 
properly. Recast variables as necessary. 
3. Run Pearson’s Product Moment correlation to identify possible variables that 
influence the Reset_Success_Enrollment and Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue 
variables. Variables with a p-value of .1 or lower will be considered of interest.  
4. Given variables of interest, run GLM Binary logistic regressions according to 
each research question. Observations with missing data are eliminated in a row-
wise basis. 
o Question 1. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in 
first-year student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
o Question 2. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net 
revenue from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition 
reset? 
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Table 2  
Binary logistic regression configuration for research questions 1 and 2 
Research 
Question 
Independent 
Variable of 
interest 
Other independent variables Dependent 
variable 
R1. PED_Sticker AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT Reset_Success_
Enrollment 
  ViabilityRatio_YearPrior  
X200Density 
  
R2. PED_Sticker AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT Reset_Success_
NetRevenue 
  App_Trend   
  DiscountRate_YearPrior 
Equity_Ratio_YearPrior 
  
  PercentPell_YearPrior 
X200Population 
  
  StickerPrice_YearPrior   
  ViabilityRatio_YearPrior   
  Year_of_Reset   
Note: Independent variables of interest found during correlation analysis.  
 
Interpretation of the binary logistic regression model output involves four steps: 
1. To assess model fit, deviance residuals should be examined to ensure they 
are evenly distributed around the median (Chapman & Feit, 2015). 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) provides information about model 
strength among a given set of data; the lower the AIC, the stronger the 
model (Mazerolle, 2007). When no further variables from the analysis set 
can be added which lower the AIC, the model is the strongest possible 
given the data available. Statistical significance of the model can be 
evaluated by implementing a Chi-Square statistic on the Degrees of 
Freedom reported in the logistic output (Hosmer & Lemesbow, 1980). 
2. After building the logistic model with the lowest possible AIC, the 
statistically significant coefficients can be identified and explained as odds 
ratios. Coefficients with a p-value of .1 are considered significant. Integer 
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variables will be interpreted so that a 1-unit change in quantity will 
correspond to a change in the log odds by the amount of the coefficient. 
For values that remain, the listing of that variable shows the change in log 
odds by the difference from the base level to the level mentioned in the 
coefficient (UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, 2019). 
Next, the log-likelihood coefficients will be transformed to odds ratios by 
calculating the exponent of the coefficient. 
3. The next step of interpreting the binary logistic regression model is to 
calculate the effectiveness of modeled predictions via a confusion matrix 
(Chapman & Feit, 2015). For each institution in the model, the research 
question-specific logistic regression is run and the applicable 
Enrollment_Success_Prob_Score and 
FYNetRevenue_Success_Prob_Score field will be populated with a value 
of 0 to 1 with the predicted likelihood of success. These calculations will 
be compared to the actual Reset_Success_Enrollment and 
Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue fields in a confusion matrix as follows: 
  
Predicted 
False 
Predicted 
True 
      
Actual 
False 
True 
Negative 
(TN)  
False 
Positive 
(FP)  
Actual 
True 
False 
Negative 
(FN)  
True 
Positive 
(TP)  
   
4. Model accuracy, precision, recall, specificity and false positive rates are 
calculated to assess varied dimensions of the model’s performance. 
Following are the definitions and calculation steps for each of these 
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diagnostic statistics drawn from the confusion matrix (Hosmer et al., 2013; 
Saito & Rehmsmeier, 2015): 
 Accuracy is calculated as follows (Analytics Vidhya Content Team, 
2015; Field, 2013; UCLA Institute for Digital Research and 
Education, 2019): 
Accuracy = (True Positive + True Negative) /  
(True Positive + True Negative+ False Positive + False Negative) 
 Precision pertains to the accuracy of predicting positive outcomes. 
Precision is calculated as follows (Saito & Rehmsmeier, 2015): 
 Precision = True Positive / (True Positive + False Positive) 
Recall pertains to the ratio of all positive cases that are accurately 
predicted by the model. Recall is calculated as follows (Saito & 
Rehmsmeier, 2015): 
Recall = True Positive / (True Positive + False Negative) 
 Specificity indicates how often negative values were predicted. 
Specificity is calculated as follows (Saito & Rehmsmeier, 2015): 
Specificity = True Negative / (True Negative + False Positive) 
 False Positive Rate indicates how often positive outcomes are 
predicted relative to the total number of actual negative events. The 
False Positive Rate is calculated as follows (Saito & Rehmsmeier, 
2015): 
False Positive Rate = False Positive / (False Positive + True 
Negative) 
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 The F-Score is a harmonic mean of precision and recall which 
rates the predictive power of a model from 1 (perfect predictions) 
to 0 (predicts perfectly incorrectly) (Hosmer et al., 2013): 
F Score = (2*Recall*Precision) / (Recall + Precision) 
Phase 3: Multivariate Linear Regression Procedure 
In phase 3, multivariate linear regression (ordinary least squares-OLS) will be 
performed in RStudio (RStudio, 2019) to explore research questions 3, 4, and 5. 
Multivariate linear regression (OLS) is a statistical method used to predict levels of a 
dependent variable based on levels of an independent variable (Chapman & Feit, 2015; 
Field, 2013; Salkind, 2017). Similar to the logistic regression, model variables were 
‘discovered’ through a purposeful step-up strategy drawing in variables from the larger 
data set (Field, 2013; Grace-Martin, 2014; Montgomery et al., 2006) as defined in 
Appendix B. The multivariate linear regression (OLS) data analysis procedure is as 
follows: 
1. Export the Excel-based data collection file into a .csv file. 
2. Run descriptive statistics for each variable and ensure datatypes are detected 
properly. Recast variable as necessary. Identify and remove extreme outliers using 
boxplots and remove them from the data set (Chapman & Feit, 2015; Field, 2013). 
3. Run the Shapiro-Wilk normality test for all integer variables to understand skew 
and normality within each variable. If the p-value is less than .10, the variable 
distribution is assumed to be normal (Chapman & Feit, 2015). While variables 
without a normal distribution were not removed from consideration in building 
linear models, it was considered important for the researcher to understand 
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possible sources of bias which could skew modeling results (Bommae, 2015; 
Field, 2013). 
4. Run Pearson’s Product Moment correlation to identify possible variables that 
influence the dependent variable for each research question. Variables with a p-
value of .1 or lower are of interest and considered for insertion in the model.  
5. Given the list of variables of interest discovered in point 4 above, run OLS 
multivariate linear regressions according to each research. Observations with 
missing data are eliminated in a row-wise basis. 
 Question 3. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student 
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
 Question 4. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee revenue 
from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
 Question 5. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in first-year Pell-eligible 
student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
 Question 6. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student enrollment 
for institutions implementing a tuition reset?  
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Table 3       
Multivariate linear regression (OLS) configuration for research questions 2,4,5 and 6 
Research 
Question 
Independent 
Variable of 
interest 
Other independent variables Dependent variable 
R3 PED_Sticker AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT Enrolled_CHG_PCT 
    App_Trend   
    Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior   
R4 PED_Sticker AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT App_Trend Net_FY_TFRevenue
_CHG_PCT 
    Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior   
    DiscountRate_Trend_2YearPrior   
    StickerPrice_CHG    
    StickerPrice_YearPrior   
R5 PED_Sticker AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior PercentPell_CHG 
  App_Trend  
  PercentPell_YearPrior  
    StickerPrice_CHG_PCT   
R6 PED_Sticker
_XFR 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT  
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior  
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT 
 
XFR_Enroll_PCT_C
HG 
Note: Independent variables of interest found during correlation analysis. 
  
6. To verify purposeful variable selection did not introduce multicollinearity, 
calculate a variance inflation factor—or VIF—for each variable in the model 
(Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2019; Grigsby, 2018). If a variable’s VIF is 
greater than 10, consider options for variable replacement and return to Step 4. 
Interpretation of the multivariate linear regression models (OLS) output involves 
only two major steps. First, the Adjusted R-squared indicates what percent of the variance 
in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables included in the model 
(Chapman & Feit, 2015; Field, 2013). 
Second, the influence of each independent variable is assessed holding all other 
variables constant. Independent variables will be considered statistically significant if 
their p-value is less than .10. A coefficient is calculated for each independent variable 
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which indicates the strength and directionality of each independent variable’s 
relationship.  
The coefficient can be read “for each one-unit change in the independent variable, 
the dependent variable will change by the coefficient value” (Berenson et al., 1992; 
Salkind, 2017). Independent variables that are not statistically significant will be left in 
the model to illustrate the model’s predictive power was enhanced by controlling for 
purposely selected and relevant variables (Grace-Martin, 2012). 
Researcher’s Perspective, Assumptions and Delimitations 
All research endeavors assume a certain level of uncertainty inherent in design 
and execution. The following are the researcher’s perspective, assumptions, and 
delimitations. Proposed mitigations are discussed as applicable.  
Researcher’s perspective 
The researcher comes to this issue as a strategist in the higher education space. 
My previous employment position was as an Associate Vice President of Strategy and 
Decision Support for a 4-year private liberal arts institution that considered a range of 
price strategies, including the tuition reset. Currently, I serve as the Market Strategy 
Analyst for Ruffalo Noel Levitz, a higher education management consulting firm, in the 
market research practice. My colleagues at Ruffalo Noel Levitz have advised some 
institutions listed in this study that have implemented tuition resets. I am frequently asked 
for recommendations about when a tuition reset is advisable. I suspect high sticker price 
is increasingly seen as a signal of cost, not quality, among low- and middle-income 
families shopping for 4-year private baccalaureate education. Finally, I believe the tuition 
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reset strategy can be viable for an increasing minority of 4-year private institutions, but 
only after careful analys is given for the very significant risks involved. 
Assumptions 
This research makes certain assumptions: 
First, the list of identified institutions is sufficiently representative of the overall 
population of institutions that have attempted tuition resets. Implementing a tuition reset 
involves significant risk and depends upon awareness building, so they are publicly 
announced.  
Second, although IPEDS provides detailed definitions of data elements required 
to complete the surveys, different institutions may interpret these uniform instructions in 
slightly different ways based on the peculiarities of their business model. 
Third, this research assumes that Form 990 data is more reliable than IPEDS data. 
When Form 990 data and IPEDS data conflict, the Form 990 data is considered 
determinative on the basis it was likely provided by an institution’s finance office 
following the annual audit rather than an institutional research office. 
Fourth, this research assumes more recent financial data is more reliable than 
earlier reported data. Occasionally year-end balance sheet items from a previous year are 
different than the corresponding beginning-of-year balance sheet items of the following 
year. In such cases, the beginning-of-year balances in the following year are considered 
determinative, and the adjustment assumed to be a correction in accounting procedures. 
Fifth, this research assumes advertising and promotion expenditures related to a 
tuition reset are represented in the advertising and promotion line in institutional Form 
990s during the year of announcing the reset.  
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Delimitations 
This study is delimited to narrow the scope of this study, the analysis will be 
performed on 142 identified institutions that have formally announced a tuition reset from 
the years 1997 through 2018 (some have performed tuition resets more than once within 
the period of observation). This list of institutions was compiled via interviews with 
industry experts (Bloom, 2017; S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; L. 
Lapovsky, personal communication, March 1, 2016) web site lists (Edvisors, 2017; 
Kantrowitz, 2017, 2019; Kottich, 2017), Google searches and Google Alerts. This list is 
narrowed further based on the availability of completeness of IPEDS data with regards to 
the required variables in all relevant years of observation.  
Peers for each of the tuition reset institutions were not identified to form a 
benchmark comparison group due to time constraints and the burdens of manual Form 
990 data collection. Future studies could include such peer sets consistent with the event-
study methodology to explore if the results of institutions that implemented a reset varied 
from those which did not, under the criteria by which benchmark institutions would be 
selected. 
The most current data available from IPEDS is currently Fall 2018 (National 
Center for Educational Statistics, 2019). Further, only private not-for-profit institutions 
will be considered as classified during the year in which the tuition reset took place to 
compare tuition reset outcomes to overall changes in sector enrollment. Some institutions 
have done tuition resets for specific populations (e.g. only in-state students) or specific 
programs (e.g. international students only, certain majors). These institutions have been 
removed from the sample as IPEDS data can only be compared at the aggregated 
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institutional level. The effects on specific subpopulations cannot be effectively and 
reliably isolated.  
Many further legitimate research questions regarding the effectiveness of tuition 
resets could be asked. Issues of net revenue from overall enrollment (both first-year and 
continuing students), changes to the academic profile, student debt loads, sustainability of 
enrollment gains when present, effects on persistence to graduation, and impact on 
perceptions of quality among diverse audiences are all valid directions for further 
research and exploration. However, to maintain a manageable focus for this research, 
only the previously referred to research questions will be addressed in this study. To 
answer these extended questions, a deeper literature review, different data gathering 
tasks, and different analytical procedures would be required. 
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Chapter 4 - Results 
In service industries such as higher education, price serves both as an indicator of 
quality and as an indicator of cost to consumers. As industries mature or transition to 
decline, consumers may transition from seeing a high price as a signal of quality to a 
signal of cost. In the higher education market, institutions find themselves increasingly 
competing based on published price as competitive pressures increase. Tuition resets, 
which a growing number of colleges have implemented or are considering, offer a natural 
experiment through which the influence of sticker price on facets of enrollment behavior 
can be explored. This study examines the relationship of sticker price sensitivity (as 
measured by sticker price elasticity) on different measures of tuition reset success for 
private not-for-profit institutions. 
Section 1 presents descriptive statistics and frequency distribution information to 
characterize institutions that implement tuition resets and provide an assessment of the 
range of outcomes they have realized. Section 2 provides the preliminary results of 
multivariate logistic regressions in support of research questions 1 and 2. Section 3 
presents the results of multivariate linear regression in support of research questions 3, 4, 
and 5. Sections 2 and 3 analyze models both with and without advertising and promotion 
variables. The chapter concludes with an analysis of three additional questions arising 
through the research process. The chapter examines evidence from the sample data to 
address these questions and suggest areas for future in-depth research: 
 How influential is the year of the tuition reset? Is there evidence that resets 
following the Great Recession (as demarcated by 2010) are successful more 
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frequently in terms of increased first-year student enrollment or net tuition and fee 
revenue from first-year students than those before the Great Recession?  
 Are there “threshold effects” which pertain to the amount of a tuition reset? 
Beyond looking for a linear correlation between the amount of the tuition reset 
and enrollment increases, this question seeks evidence that tuition resets need to 
be of a certain size to begin with before positive effects could even be expected. 
 Do tuition resets have an impact on retention? An increase in the retention of 
continuing students helps offset the cost of lost revenue from near full-pay and 
full-pay students. 
Section 1. Frequency Distribution Results 
Tuition reset announcements frequently refer to both the fall term and a 
hyphenated academic year when the new pricing is in effect. The academic year bridges 
two calendar years. The earlier calendar year indicates the fall term when the new tuition 
level and enrollment results from the first year of recruiting are measured. The second 
calendar year indicates the spring term and is when the final financial results of a tuition 
reset are measured. An institution's fiscal year is aligned with this later year. This study 
uses the hyphenated format for the year of a reset in this section to aid future researchers 
seeking to replicate this study. The early year is needed to obtain the correct institutional 
characteristics, admissions and enrollment IPEDS files. The later year is needed to obtain 
the associated financial IPEDS data and Form 990 data.  
Within the 24-year span from academic years 1996-1997 to 2019-2020, 142 
institutions implemented some form of tuition reset. Tuition resets were rare through 
2010-2011, with some intervening years (1997-1998, 2000-2001,2001-2002, 2007-2008) 
Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success 55 
having no resets at all. However, starting in 2011-2012 the number of tuition resets 
increased to six or more each year. In all but three years, private not-for-profit, 4-year or 
above institutions implemented most tuition resets. Figure 1 and Table 4 present the 
number of institutions of all types implementing tuition resets at some level (institutional 
or for select programs) for each year where one or more tuition resets took place. 
Figure 1 
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Table 4       
Number of tuition resets each year  
Year of Reset All Resets Private not-for-profit, 
4-year or above 
Other control 
1996-1997 2 2 0 
1998-1999 3 3 0 
1999-2000 4 2 2 
2002-2003 2 2 0 
2003-2004 2 2 0 
2004-2005 3 2 1 
2005-2006 1 1 0 
2006-2007 1 1 0 
2008-2009 3 3 0 
2009-2010 2 2 0 
2010-2011 1 1 0 
2011-2012 5 5 0 
2012-2013 8 8 0 
2013-2014 15 11 4 
2014-2015 13 12 1 
2015-2016 20 14 6 
2016-2017 14 3 11 
2017-2018 6 5 1 
2018-2019 24 17 7 
2019-2020 10 10 0 
2020-2021 3 3 0 
Note: Tuition resets counted at an institutional level only. The source is IPEDS Data Center.  
72 private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions that implemented tuition resets between 
2002-2003 and 2017-2018 are of special interest for this study.  
 
  
 Over the last 24 years, all types of institutions—public or private, 2-year or 4-
year, colleges or universities—implemented tuition resets. However, private not-for-
profit, 4-year or above institutions implemented 77% of resets. Tuition resets at public 
institutions can be system-wide, but also in response to mandates from public officials. 
Table 5 presents the frequency of tuition resets by institutional control as reported 
through IPEDS. 
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Table 5       
Institution tuition resets by institutional control  
  N Percent   
Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above 109 77%   
Public, 4-year or above 23 16%   
Private for-profit, 4-year or above 3 2%   
Administrative Unit 3 2%   
Public, 2-year 2 1%   
Private for-profit, 2-year 1 1%   
Private not-for-profit, 2-year 1 1%   
Total 142 
 
  
Note: Tuition resets counted at an institutional level only. The source is IPEDS Data Center. 
 
Tuition resets also occurred throughout all BEA statistical regions of the United 
States, especially in the Southeast (30%), Great Lakes (19%), and Mid East (15%). Table 
6 presents the count and percentage of tuition resets that occur within each BEA 
statistical region as reported through IPEDS. For greater context, Table 6 also presents 
the number of institutions in each region from all sectors. Multi-region refers to 
institutions with major campuses in multiple states or a significant online presence. 
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Table 6 
Tuition resets by BEA Statistical regions 
BEA Region Total 
Institutions 
Reset 
Institutions 
Percent of 
Reset 
Institutions 
Percent of 
institutions 
in each 
region 
doing reset 
States Included 
Southeast 1,540 42 30% 3% AL AR FL GA KY 
LA MS NC SC TN 
VA WV 
Great Lakes 895 27 19% 3% IL IN MI OH WI 
Mid East 1,037 21 15% 2% DE DC MD NJ NY 
PA 
Far West 889 17 12% 2% AK CA HI NV OR 
WA 
Plains 519 11 8% 2% IA KS MN MO NE 
ND SD 
New England 351 10 7% 3% CT ME MA NH RI 
VT 
Southwest 656 9 6% 1% AZ NM OK TX 
Rocky 
Mountains 
246 3 2% 1% CO ID MT UT WY 
Multi-region 5 2 1% 40% Multiple states or 
online 
Total 6,138 142 
   
Note: Tuition resets counted at the institutional and program level. The source is IPEDS Data 
Center 
 
  
Of the 142 identified institutions that implemented any form of a tuition reset, 72 
private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions implemented tuition resets at the 
institution level between academic years 2002-2003 and 2017-2018. Data collection for 
this study focused on this group of 72 institutions. Table 7 summarizes several important 
characteristics of these 72 institutions. 
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Table 7           
Characteristics of institutions implementing tuition reset strategy 
  N 25th 
Percentile 
Median Average 75th 
Percentile 
Sticker price before reset 72 $19,688 $25,475 $28,120 $37,464 
Sticker price change by 
percent 
72 -9.92% -17% -18% -24% 
Sticker price change in 
dollars 
72 ($2,130) ($4,084) ($4,967) ($6,956) 
Sticker Price following reset 72 $15,760 $21,180 $23,153 $29,585 
Population 100 miles 72 3,396,204 6,038,902 8,720,441 9,612,004 
Population 200 miles 72 14,866,474 20,830,766 22,756,810 27,099,683 
Population Density 100 
miles 
72 128 210 367 440 
Population Density 200 
miles 
72 141 197 260 334 
Sticker Price Elasticity  71 (3.37) (0.28) (0.07) 4.07 
Transfer Sticker Price 
Elasticity 
56 (1.77) 0.27 2.26 5.04 
Net Price Elasticity  66 0.50 0.80 0.90 1.04 
Advertising and Promotion 
Spend Year Prior 
43 $61,477 $186,812 $439,693 $453,197 
Change in Advertising 
Spend in Percent Year Prior 
37 -27.05% 2% 22% 33% 
Equity Ratio Year Prior 63 47.50 65.00 58.49 76.50 
Viability Ratio Year Prior 50 0.08 0.53 0.79 1.26 
Change in Net Assets Ratio 
Year Prior 
55 (0.00) 0.02 0.05 0.09 
FIT SCORE CFI Year Prior 50 0.40 2.14 2.99 3.86 
Application Trend 51 -8.03% 6% 28% 40% 
Enrolled Trend 71 -33.14% -6% 0% 12% 
Transfer Enrolled Trend 61 -19.72% 6% 181% 42% 
Discount Rate Prior 67 17.67% 36% 35% 53% 
Discount Rate Trend-2 
Years Prior 
66 -2.51% 2% 1% 8% 
Percent Pell - Year Prior 63 37% 47% 51% 66% 
Note: 72 Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions that implemented a tuition reset 
between 2002-2003 and 2017-2018. Interpret each row independently. 
 
  
Important observations of tuition reset and institution characteristics from Table 7 are: 
 The average tuition reset amount is 18% of the sticker price. 
 The average tuition reset expressed in dollars is $4,967, or approximately $5,000. 
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 The range of sticker price elasticity for first-year students (from -3.37 to 4.07) and 
transfer students (from -1.77 to 5.04) suggests a wide range of behavioral 
responses to sticker prices in the years preceding a tuition reset. Negative 
elasticities mean when sticker price increases, the number of enrolled students 
decreases. Elasticities less than -1 reflect ‘elastic’ behavior (for a 1% decline in 
price, there is a larger percent increase in enrollment). For elasticities between 0 
and -1, consumers are price inelastic (for a 1% drop in price, there is a smaller 
percentage increase in enrollment). If the elasticity is positive, the market is 
starting to reflect Veblen effects where a higher price can increase enrollment. See 
Appendix C for more detail. 
 The financial condition of institutions implementing resets is leaning towards the 
lower middle range of the Austen Group’s FIT Score Range; a scale from -4 to 10. 
CFI scores for many institutions performing a tuition reset range from .40 to 3.86. 
Falling in the lower ranges of the scale indicates the need for “thorough review of 
institutional effectiveness” or “significant changes needed to achieve their 
mission” (The Austen Group, 2019b).  
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Table 8 summarizes the actual tuition reset results for the 72 private not-for-profit 
institutions. The potential risks involved with tuition resets becomes clear in that at the 
25th percentile many outcome measures are highly undesirable. 
Table 8           
Range of actual outcomes from tuition reset 
  N 25th 
Percentile 
Median Average 75th 
Percentile 
Applications Change in percent 57 -7% 8% 19% 25% 
Applications Change count 57 (29) 119 215 298 
Change in Yield 57 -4% 0% 3% 5% 
NACUBO Discount Rate Change 57 -15% -5% -6% 3% 
Enrollment Change Percent (Y0) 70 -12% 0% 19% 33% 
Net Revenue Change Percent (Y0) 57 -26% -4% 15% 23% 
Percent FY Pell 57 -5% 1% 1% 7% 
Retention Change  60 -2% 2% 5% 9% 
Transfer Enrolled Change by Percent 61 -20% 6% 18% 42% 
Note: Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions that implemented a tuition reset between 
FY2003 and FY2018. Interpret each row independently. 
  
We can observe the following for institutions with available outcomes data: 
 Institutions implementing a tuition reset expect to see an increase in completed 
applications, but at the 25th percentile, there is a decline of 7%. 
 At the 25th percentile of all institutions that implemented a tuition reset, yield 
rates decreased by 4% or more. The decrease in yield can offset gains from 
increased applications, or compound losses if applications were the same or 
lower. 
 Most institutions saw a reduction in the NACUBO Discount Rate, which is 
positive and expected. However, at the 75th percentile institutions had an increase 
in discount rate. This could be a result if institutions reduced both sticker price 
and average net price. 
 The median result of a tuition reset is a loss of 4% of revenue from first-year 
students. Considering an additional loss from continuing full-pay and near full-
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pay students, the potential for revenue loss from a tuition reset should be taken 
quite seriously. 
 Over half of institutions implementing a tuition reset experienced a 1% or greater 
increase in first-year Pell student enrollment in the first year of the new lower 
tuition. 
 Half of the institutions which implemented a tuition reset experienced an increase 
of 2% or more increase in first-year student retention. 
 Half of the institutions which implemented a tuition reset experienced an increase 
in transfer student enrollment of 6% or more. 
Positive outcomes from tuition resets are possible, but they are not without 
assuming significant risk. Identifying factors that predict successful outcomes becomes 
an important task. 
Section 2. Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression Results 
Multivariate logistic regression is used to identify the influence of independent 
variables on the likelihood of an event occurring (Stoltzfus, 2011). Research Questions 1 
and 2 analyze the influence of sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) on the likelihood of 
increasing first-year students enrolled (Reset_Success_Enrollment)(R1) and net tuition 
and fee revenue from first-year students (Reset_Success_Revenue)(R2). Because 
advertising and promotion data was available for only 43 of the 72 private not-for-profit 
institutions, two models are developed using purposeful stepwise selection both with and 
without the advertising and promotion variables for each research question. Following are 
the results of each model: 
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Research Question 1 
The most basic assessment of the success of a tuition reset is whether it is likely to 
result in more first-year students enrolling. Assuming the reason for considering a tuition 
reset is that the institution perceives sticker price sensitivity of prospective students, R1 
asks:  
R1: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in 
first-year student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?  
Because this question pertains to the probability of an event, namely the 
successful recruitment of more first-year students (Reset_Success_Enrollment), we use 
the following logistic regression model (Stoltzfus, 2011) to test the influence of sticker 
price elasticity (PED_Sticker) on the likelihood of increased enrollment without 
considering the influence of advertising:  
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε 
where, 
Logit(y) is the log odds that a tuition reset will result in a 5% or greater increase in 
first-year student enrollment (Reset_Success_Enrollment). 
α is constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
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X2 is the viability ratio in the year prior to a tuition reset (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior), 
assessing how strategically the institution manages financial resources, including 
debt, to advance the institution’s mission. 
X3 is the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible (PercentPell_YearPrior) 
X4 is the population density in the area within 200 miles of the campus implementing 
a tuition reset (X200Density). 
The logistic model runs on a sample of 45 institutions with valid data. Table 9 
presents the results.  
Table 9         
Logistic regression analysis of FY enrollment success without advertising variables  
  Odds Ratio 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Regression 
Coefficient 
p-value 
PED_Sticker 1.0021 0.9676-1.0501 0.1200 0.9042 
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior 2.1839 1.185-5.3958 2.0850 0.0371** 
PercentPell_YearPrior 1.0376 1.0003-1.0839 1.8340 0.0666* 
X200Density 1.0032 0.9991-1.0078 1.4590 0.1445 
N 45 Chi-Squared 10.4261   
AIC 61.935 Degrees of Freedom 4   
Loglikelihood -25.96742 (5) p-value 0.0338   
Dispersion 1.2983       
  Predicted False Predicted True     
          
Actual False 17 6     
Actual True 8 13     
          
Accuracy 0.6818 Precision  0.6842   
Recall 0.6190 False Positive Rate 0.2609   
Specificity  0.7391 Error 0.3182   
F-Score 0.6500    
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively  
 
  
The results show sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is not associated with a 
higher probability of increasing enrollment 5% or more first-year students 
(Reset_Success_Enrollment). The significant explanatory variables are 
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior and PercentPell_YearPrior. The viability ratio provides an 
Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success 65 
indicator of the financial vitality of an institution. As an institution’s vitality ratio in the 
year prior to a tuition reset increase, the odds of enrolling 5% or more first-year students 
(Reset_Success_Enrollment) increase by a factor of 2.1839. The federal Pell grant 
program helps low-income families afford college, and thus the percent of an institution’s 
first-year class that is Pell-eligible be a proxy for serving low-income students. For each 
percent of an institution’s first-year cohort being Pell-eligible in the year prior to a tuition 
reset (PercentPell_YearPrior), the odds of enrolling 5% or more first-year students 
increase by a factor of 1.0376. 
To assess the model fit, we note the model’s Chi-Squared is 10.4261 and the p-
value is 0.0371 and significant at the 5% level. The Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) 
statistic is a relative measure of model fit with lower values preferred to higher. In the 
next model, the AIC declines which indicate a better “fit” of results by the explanatory 
variables with the addition of advertising variables. 
Ratios of the confusion matrix characterize the efficacy of explanatory variables 
employed in the model. The model predicted outcomes for Reset_Success_Enrollment 
with 68% accuracy. When the model predicts positive outcomes (Precision), they were 
correct 68% of the time. The model’s False Positive Rate (e.g. a positive outcome 
predicted when a negative result occurred) was 26%. As previously defined, the F-Score 
is a harmonic mean of precision and recall which rates the predictive power of a model 
from 1 (perfect predictions) to 0 (predicts perfectly incorrectly). The F-Score for this 
model is 0.6500 enabling comparison to other models.  
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The second proposed model which includes advertising variables is as follows: 
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε 
where, 
Logit(y) is the log odds that a tuition reset will result in 5% or greater increase in 
first-year student enrollment (Reset_Success_Enrollment). 
α is constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines 
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an 
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures. 
X3 is the population density in the area within 200 miles of the campus implementing 
a tuition reset (X200Density). 
X4 is the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible (PercentPell_YearPrior). 
The logistic model runs with a sample of 32 institutions with valid data. Table 10 
shows the results. 
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Table 10         
Logistic regression analysis of FY enrollment success with advertising 
  Odds Ratio 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Regression 
Coefficient 
p-value 
PED_Sticker 0.7584 0.5697-0.9328 -0.2766 0.0242*
* 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PC
T 
16.5420 2.6728-292.3708 2.8059 0.0158*
* 
X200Density 1.0069 1.001-1.0145 0.0069 0.0375*
* 
PercentPell_YearPrior 0.9550 0.8915-1.0079 -0.0460 0.1278 
N 32 Chi-Squared 14.1724   
AIC 40.064 Degrees of 
Freedom 
4   
Loglikelihood -15.03120 
(5) 
p-value 0.0068   
Dispersion 1.1135       
  Predicted 
False 
Predicted True     
          
Actual False 15 2     
Actual True 3 12     
          
Accuracy 0.8438 Precision  0.8571   
Recall 0.8000 False Positive Rate 0.1176   
Specificity  0.8824 Error 0.1563   
F-Score 0.8276       
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
  
The results show sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a statistically significant 
explanatory variable of tuition reset enrollment success (Reset_Success_Enrollment), as 
defined by a 5% or greater increase in first-year students. The more price-sensitive an 
institution’s population of prospective students are (as indicated by a 1 unit decrease in 
PED_Sticker) the odds of tuition success increase by a factor of .7584.  
However, the effect of sticker price elasticity is minor (.7584) relative to increases 
in advertising and promotion spending (AdvertisingPromotion_CHG_PCT) and 
population density within a 20-mile radius of the institution implementing a tuition reset 
(X200Density). For each percent increase in advertising and promotion spending, the 
odds of successfully increasing first-year student enrollment by 5% or more increase by a 
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factor of 16.542. For each percent increase in population density within 200 miles radius 
of campus, the odds of a successful reset increase by a factor of 1.0069. 
The Chi-squared of the model is 14.1724 and the p-value is 0.0068, which is 
significant at the 1% level. The Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) statistic, a relative 
measure of model fit where lower values are preferred, is 40.064, which reflects marked 
improvement compared to the previous model’s AIC of 61.935. 
Ratios of the confusion matrix for the model with advertising variables compare 
favorably to the previous model in terms of the efficacy of predictions. The model 
predicts outcomes for Reset_Success_Enrollment with 84% accuracy, a substantive 
improvement over 68% from the previous model. Positive outcomes are predicted 
(Precision) correctly 86% of the time, a substantial improvement over 68% in the 
previous model. The False Positive Rate was (e.g. a positive outcome predicted when a 
negative result occurred) 12%, which is also an improvement over the 26% in the earlier 
model. The F-Score of this model is 0.8276, higher than 0.6500 in the previous model. 
Including the percent change in advertising and promotion spending improved the 
predictive power of this model by each measure. 
Based on these models, sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a statistically 
significant influence on tuition reset success (Reset_Success_Enrollment). High 
population density (X200Density) and more advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) also increase the odds of successful tuition resets 
substantively. If advertising and promotion spending are not considered, a higher 
percentage of low-income students as represented by Pell-eligibility 
(PercentPell_YearPrior) in an institution’s incoming first-year student body increases the 
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probability of tuition reset success (Reset_Success_Enrollment) indicating the Pell 
students are likely to be sticker-price sensitive. 
Research Question 2 
A second basic assessment of the success of a tuition reset is whether the strategy 
is likely to result in an increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students. An 
institution can successfully recruit more first-year students attracted by a lower sticker 
price, but also lose net tuition and fee revenue by additionally giving substantive 
discounts. Therefore, the second research question is: 
R2: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net 
revenue from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition 
reset?  
Because this question pertains to the probability of an event, in this case, a 5% or 
greater increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(Reset_Success_Revenue), the following logistic regression model (Stoltzfus, 2011), 
using stepwise variable selection, tests the influence of sticker price elasticity on the 
likelihood of increased net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, without 
considering the influence of advertising:  
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β 5X5+ β 6X6 + α 
where, 
Logit(y) is the log odds a tuition reset will reset in 5% or greater increase in net 
tuition and fee revenue from first-year student enrollment (Reset_Success_Revenue). 
α is constant. 
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X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is Percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible in the year prior to a tuition 
reset (PercentPell_YearPrior). 
X3 is the change in applications between years -3 and -1 expressed as a percentage of 
applications in year -3 (App_Trend) 
X4 is the viability ratio in the year prior to a tuition reset (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior), 
assessing how strategically the institution manages financial resources, including 
debt, to advance the institution’s mission. 
X5 represents the discount rate as the first-year NACUBO Discount Rate during year 
-1 (DiscountRate_YearPrior). 
X6 is the Sticker price in the year prior to a reset (StickerPrice_YearPrior), which is 
the sum of published tuition, fees, room and board. The sticker price is an attribute of 
the institution resetting tuition separate from sticker price elasticity which is an 
attribute of the first-year student population considering an institution. This variable 
is included with the presumption the higher the sticker price is prior to a tuition reset, 
the more net revenue will potentially be gained through a tuition reset. 
 The first logistic model for R2—without considering the advertising and 
promotion spending variables—runs on a sample of 37 institutions with valid data. Table 
11 below shows the results. 
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Table 11         
Logistic regression analysis of FY net revenue success without advertising spending variables  
  Odds Ratio 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Regression 
Coefficient 
p-value 
PED_Sticker 1.0538 0.9474-1.2112 0.0524 0.3794 
PercentPell_YearPrior 1.0221 0.9736-1.0788 0.0219 0.3862 
App_Trend 0.7639 0.2331-2.7518 -0.2693 0.6478 
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior 1.8948 0.9711-4.4688 0.6391 0.0821* 
DiscountRate_Prior 536.7361 1.7121-1215662 6.2860 0.0677* 
StickerPrice_YearPrior 0.9999 0.9997-1.0000 -0.0001 0.1058 
N 37 Chi-Squared 7.6941   
AIC 56.266 Degrees of 
Freedom 
6   
Loglikelihood -21.1332 (7) p-value 0.2614   
Dispersion 1.4089       
  Predicted 
False 
Predicted True     
          
Actual False 18 4     
Actual True 7 8     
          
Accuracy 0.7027 Precision  0.6667   
Recall 0.5333 False Positive Rate 0.1818   
Specificity  0.8182 Error 0.2973   
F-Score 0.5926       
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
  
Results show that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a 
statistically significant influence on the probability of tuition reset success measured by 
5% or more increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(Reset_Success_Revenue). While the viability ratio (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior) and 
discount rate (DiscountRate_Prior) are significant, the model’s fit remains poor. The Chi-
squared is only 7.6941 and the p-value is 0.2614, which is not significant at any 
conventional significance level.  
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The second proposed model—which includes the advertising spending variable—
is as follows: 
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ β 5X5+ β 6X6 + ε 
where, 
Logit(y) is the log odds a tuition reset will result in 5% or greater increase in first-
year student net tuition and fee revenue (Reset_Success_Revenue) or not. 
α is constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines 
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an 
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures. 
X3 is the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible (PercentPell_YearPrior) 
X4 is the population in the area within 200 miles of the campus implementing a 
tuition reset (X200Population). 
X5 is the equity ratio, which measures an institution’s leverage. The equity ratio 
compares total assets to total equity. Higher equity ratios imply a more conservative 
approach to financial management and lower debt. Equity ratio year prior 
(Equity_Ratio_YearPrior) is the equity ratio of an institution at year -1.  
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X6 is the year a reset occurs (Year_of_Reset). It indicates the year of the fall semester 
when the newly reduced published sticker price is put into effect. A positive 
correlation means the more recent the reset the greater the likelihood of success. 
The second logistic model for R2—with consideration of the advertising and 
promotion spending variables—is run on a sample of 30 institutions with valid data. 
Results are presented in Table 12 below. 
Table 12 
Logistic regression analysis of FY Net Revenue Success considering advertising and  
promotion variables 
  Odds Ratio 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Regression 
Coefficient 
p-value 
PED_Sticker 0.8876 0.7078-1.0581 -0.1192 0.2222 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT 8.4963 1.4627-168.6628 2.1400 0.0612* 
PercentPell_YearPrior 0.9934 0.919-1.0709 -0.0066 0.8606 
X200Population 1.0000 0.9999-1.0000 0.0000 0.1798 
Equity_Ratio_YearPrior 1.0626 0.9911-1.1704 0.0607 0.1231 
Year_of_Reset 2.8640 1.2265-11.7298 1.0520 0.0599* 
N 30 Wald Chi Square 14.4268   
AIC 39.954 Degrees of 
Freedom 
6   
Loglikelihood -12.9770 (7) p-value 0.0252   
Dispersion 1.1284       
  Predicted 
False 
Predicted True     
          
Actual False 15 3     
Actual True 3 9     
          
Accuracy 0.8000 Precision  0.7500   
Recall 0.7500 False Positive Rate 0.1667   
Specificity  0.8333 Error 0.2000   
F-Score 0.7500       
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
  
The results show that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a 
statistically significant influence on the probability of tuition reset success in terms of net 
tuition and fee revenue, from first-year students (Reset_Success_Revenue) using a 5% or 
greater increase as criteria for success. Increased spending in advertising and promotion 
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(AdvertisingPromotion_CHG_PCT) and the year of reset (Year_of_Reset) have 
significant statistical influence. For each percent increase in advertising and promotion 
spending in the year prior to a reset, the odds of increasing the net tuition and fee revenue 
5% or more will increase by a factor of 8.4963. For each year beyond 2001, the odds of 
increasing net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students increased by a factor of 
2.8640. We will examine the influence of year on tuition reset outcomes more closely in 
the next section.  
The model provides a good fit as the Chi-squared is 14.4268 and the p-value is 
0.0252, which is significant at the 5% level. The Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) 
statistic, a relative measure of model fit where lower values are preferred, is 39.954 
representing a marked improvement compared to the previous model’s AIC of 56.266.  
To characterize the efficacy of predictions provided by this model, we examine 
ratios of the confusion matrix. The model predicts outcomes for Reset_Success_Revenue 
with 80% accuracy (meaning both positive and negative outcomes are predicted 
correctly). Positive outcomes are predicted (Precision) correctly 75% of the time. The 
False Positive Rate, measuring the chance of a positive outcome predicted when a 
negative result occurred, is 17%. The F-Score of this model which includes advertising is 
0.75 which is an improvement over 0.5926 in the previous model. By each measure, 
including the percent change in advertising and promotion, spending improves the 
predictive performance of this model over the first model for R2. 
Based on these models, there is no evidence that sticker price elasticity in the year 
prior to a tuition reset influences the likelihood of having a 5% or more increase in net 
tuition and fee revenue from first-year students. However, an increase in advertising and 
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promotion spending in the year preceding a reset increases the odds of institutions 
realizing 5% or more increases in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students in 
the first year of the reset.  
Section 3. Multivariate Linear Regression Results (OLS) 
While logistic regression asks if an independent variable increases the likelihood 
of an event occurring, linear regression asks a related but separate question; does an 
increase in levels of an independent variable influence the levels of a dependent variable. 
In this section, we use multivariate linear regression (OLS) to investigate if sticker price 
elasticity can be used to predict the change in the number of first-year students enrolled 
(R3), the change in the amount of net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(R4), the percent of first-year students enrolled that are Pell-eligible (R5), and the change 
in the number of transfer students enrolled (R6) for institutions that implement tuition 
resets.  
As in the previous section, advertising and promotion spending data is available 
for only 43 of the 72 private not-for-profit institutions. Therefore, two models are 
developed using purposeful stepwise selection methods, one consideration of the 
advertising and promotion spending variables and the other without for each research 
question.  
Research Question 3 
In R1, partial support is found that sticker price elasticity is a significant predictor 
of the likelihood of enrolling more first-year students among institutions that perform 
tuition resets. Here, the model tests if increasing levels of sticker price elasticity can be 
used to predict increasing levels of enrollment: 
Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success 76 
R3: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student 
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
To predict the percentage change in first-year student enrollment 
(Enrolled_CHG_PCT) the following model which does not consider advertising and 
promotion spending variables is constructed using stepwise variable selection. Variable 
inflation factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect from overfitting due to 
collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model (Grigsby, 2018). 
The model is: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ ε 
where, 
y is the percent change in first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) in the 
year of a tuition reset. 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population 
in the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the 
percent change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker 
price. 
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to 
Year -1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted 
assets. A positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
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X3 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend), which is 
expressed as a percentage growth rate. A positive number indicates an increase in 
applications and a negative number indicates a decline.  
X4 is the sticker price during the year of a tuition reset announcement 
(StickerPrice_YearPrior) as expressed in dollars. Sticker price includes tuition, 
fees, room and board. 
The first OLS linear regression model for R3—without consideration of the 
advertising and promotion spending variable—runs on a sample of 44 institutions with 
valid data. Table 13 shows the results. 
Table13 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student enrollment without considering 
advertising and promotion variables 
  β Std. 
Error 
T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker -0.0128 0.0121 -1.0630   0.2941 1.1168 
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior 3.6910 0.6740 5.4760   0.0000 *** 1.0778 
StickerPrice_YearPrior 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9040   0.3716 1.2211 
App_Trend 0.2574 0.1504 1.7120   0.0949 * 1.3095 
N 44 F Statistic 9.438 (4,39) 
Adjusted R2 0.4398 p-value 0.0000 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively  
  
Results show sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a statistically 
significant influence on changes in first-year student enrollment (Enrolled_CHG_PCT). 
However, institutions with growth in net assets 
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) and growth in application volume 
(App_Trend) in the years preceding a tuition reset are better positioned to experience 
growth in first-year student enrollment. For each 1% increase in net assets, the first-year 
student enrollment increases by 3.69%. For each 1% increase in application volume, the 
first-year student enrollment increases by 0.2574%.  
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To assess the fitness of the model, we observe the model’s p-value is 0.0000, 
which is significant at the 1% level. The model explains 43.98% of the variance in the 
change in first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) using the sample of 44 
institutions. 
The second proposed model, which includes the influence of the advertising and 
promotion spending variable, is as follows: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ ε 
where, 
y is the percent change in first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) in the 
year of a tuition reset 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity indicates the percent change 
of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines 
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an 
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures. 
X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year 
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A 
positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
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X4 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend), which is 
expressed as a percentage growth rate. A positive number indicates an increase in 
applications and a negative number indicates a decline.  
The second OLS linear regression model for R3, which includes the advertising and 
promotion spending variable is run on a sample of 30 institutions with valid data. Table 
14 presents the results. 
Table 14             
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student enrollment including 
advertising and promotion variables 
  β Std. 
Error 
T value p-value 
  
VIF 
PED_Sticker -0.0094 0.0239 -0.3930 0.6979    1.3332 
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior 3.8912 0.7225 5.3860 0.0000*** 1.2982 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT 0.3247 0.1818 1.7860 0.0862* 1.1607 
App_Trend -0.0270 0.2657 -0.1020 0.9199 1.0949 
N 30 F Statistic 11.24 (4,25) 
Adjusted R2 0.5855 p-value 0.0000 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
  
    
In this second model, sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a 
statistically significant influence on changes in first-year students enrolled 
(Enrolled_CHG_PCT). Change in net assets year prior 
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) and advertising and promotion spending 
change by percent (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) do have significant influence. For 
each 1% increase in net assets, first-year students enrollment increases by 3.8912%. For 
each 1% increase in advertising and promotion spending in the year a reset is announced, 
first-year students enrollment increases by 0.3247%. 
The model’s fit is good with a p-value of 0.0000, which is significant even at the 
1% level. The model explains 58.55% of the variance in the change in first-year students 
enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT). Although the sample size is smaller, inclusion of the 
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advertising and promotion spending variable enhanced the explanatory power of this 
model as the F Statistic increased from 9.438 to 11.240. 
Both models for R3 show that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a no 
statistically significant influence on the first-year student enrollment 
(Enrolled_Change_PCT) at institutions implementing a tuition reset. However, consistent 
with suggestions from previous studies, institutions implementing tuition resets which 
invest more in advertising and promotion during the year preceding a reset and exhibit 
increasing financial health (e.g. a positive change in net assets) are better positioned to 
enjoy higher levels of enrollment gain through the tuition reset process. 
Research Question 4 
In R2 sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) was not a significant predictor of the 
likelihood of increasing net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) among institutions that perform tuition resets. Here, 
we develop models to examine if sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) can be used to 
predict the change in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). 
R4: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee 
revenue from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition 
reset? 
To predict a change in net tuition and fee revenue on a percentage basis 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) the following model which does not consider the 
advertising and promotion spending variables is constructed using stepwise variable 
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selection. Variable inflation factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect 
from overfitting due to collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the 
model (Grigsby, 2018). The model is: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β5X5+ β6X6 + ε 
where, 
y is the percent change in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) in the year of a tuition reset 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population 
in the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the 
percent change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker 
price. 
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to 
Year -1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted 
assets. A positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
X3 represents the percentage change in NACUBO Discount Rate between years -3 
and -1 (DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior). 
X4 is the sticker price during the year of a tuition reset announcement 
(StickerPrice_YearPrior) as expressed in dollars. Sticker price includes tuition, 
fees, room and board. 
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X5 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) which is 
expressed as a percentage change in applications. A positive value for App_Trend 
indicates an increase in applications.  
X6 is the dollar amount of the tuition reset (StickerPrice_CHG). A negative value 
for StickerPrice_CHG indicates sticker price was reduced during the tuition reset 
event.  
The first OLS linear regression model for R4—without consideration of 
the advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 44 institutions with 
valid data. Table 15 presents the results: 
Table 15 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student net revenue without 
considering advertising and promotion variables  
  β Std. 
Error 
T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker 0.0070 0.0184 0.3820 0.7050 1.3446 
Change_in_Net_Assets 
_Ratio_YearPrior 
2.5570 0.9388 2.7240 0.0098*** 1.0838 
DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior 2.0550 0.8719 2.3570 0.0238** 1.4713 
StickerPrice_YearPrior -0.0000 0.0000 -2.1310 0.0398** 1.7251 
App_Trend -0.0289 0.2162 -0.1340 0.8945 1.4029 
StickerPrice_CHG 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0580 0.2969 1.4460 
N 44 F Statistic 3.575 (6,37) 
Adjusted R2 0.2644 p-value 0.0068 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively  
  
No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a statistically 
significant influence on changes in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). The significant variables are Change in Net Assets 
Year Prior (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), Discount Rate Trend Two Years 
Prior (DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior), and Sticker Price Year Prior 
(StickerPrice_YearPrior). For each 1% increase in net assets, the net tuition and fee 
revenue from first year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by 
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2.575%. For each 1% increase in discount rate between years -3 and -1 
(DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior), first-year student net tuition and fee revenue 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by 2.055%. For each $1,000 increase in 
sticker price (StickerPrice_YearPrior) in the year prior to a tuition reset, net tuition and 
fee revenue from first-year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will decrease by 
0.03809%. This final point is counter-intuitive as institutions with higher sticker prices 
would be expected to benefit the most from a tuition reset. 
The model’s p-value is 0.0068, which is significant at the 1% level. The model 
explains 26.44% of the variance in the change in net tuition and fee revenue from first-
year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). The F Statistic is comparatively low at 
3.575. 
The second proposed model—which includes the advertising and promotion 
spending variable—is as follows: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β5X5 + ε 
where, 
y is the percent change in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) in the year of a tuition reset 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 represents the percentage change in NACUBO Discount Rate between years -3 
and -1 (DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior). 
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X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year 
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A 
positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
X4 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines 
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an 
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures. 
X5 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) which is 
expressed as a percentage change in applications. A positive value for App_Trend 
indicates an increase in applications.  
The second OLS linear regression model for R4—including the 
advertising and promotion spending variables—runs on a sample of 30 
institutions with valid data. Table 16 presents the results:  
Table 16 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student net revenue considering 
advertising and promotion variables 
  β Std. 
Error 
T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker -0.0539 0.0354 -1.5220 0.1411 1.3394 
DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior 7.3915 1.9395 3.8110 0.0008*** 2.5106 
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_Year
Prior 
2.3523 1.0666 2.2050 0.0372** 1.2989 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT 0.5667 0.3000 1.8890 0.0710* 1.4508 
App_Trend 1.2054 0.5801 2.0780 0.0486** 2.3959 
N 30 F Statistic 5.915 (5,24) 
Adjusted R2 0.4587 p-value 0.0011 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
  
The results present no evidence that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a 
statistically significant influence on changes in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year 
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students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). Rather, the significant variables are the two-
year trend of the NACUBO Discount Rate prior to the year of a reset announcement 
(DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior), change in net assets in the year prior to a reset 
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), increased spending in advertising and 
promotion (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT), and trends in application volume 
(App_Trend). For each 1% increase in discount rate between years -3 to -1 
(DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior) the percent change in first-year student net tuition and 
fee revenue (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase 7.3915%. For each 1% 
increase in net assets, the percent change in first-year student net tuition and fee revenue 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by 2.3523%. For each 1% increase in 
advertising and promotional spending in year -1 (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) the 
percent change in first-year student net tuition and fee revenue 
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by .5667%. For each 1% increase in 
applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) the percent change in first-year student 
net tuition and fee revenue (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase 1.2054%. 
The model’s p-value is 0.0011, which is significant even at the 1% level. The 
model explains 45.87% of the variance in the change in net tuition and fee revenue from 
first-year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). The F-statistic is stronger at 5.915 
compared to 3.575, compared to the earlier model. 
Given both models for R4, no direct support is found that sticker price elasticity 
(PED_Sticker) is a statistically significant predictor of the percent change of net tuition 
and fee revenue from first-year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) at institutions 
implementing a tuition reset. However, consistent with suggestions from previous studies, 
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institutions implementing tuition resets which invest in increased advertising and 
promotion during the year preceding a reset, have rising discount rates and increasing 
application pools in the years leading up to the year of the tuition reset announcement and 
exhibit growth in net assets are better positioned to enjoy increased net tuition and fee 
revenue from first-year students through the tuition reset process.  
Research Question 5 
 One of the motivations institutions cite for implementing tuition resets is to attract 
low-income students which may believe attendance at a private not-for-profit institution 
is out of reach. The presumption is if the sticker price was reduced, a larger number of 
lower-income students would consider an institution and enroll. Pell grants are income-
based federal education grants which can serve as a proxy for low-income student 
segments. The fifth research question is as follows:  
R5: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in the percentage of 
first-year Pell-eligible student enrollment for institutions implementing a 
tuition reset? 
To predict changes in the percent of Pell-eligible students in the first-year cohort 
(PercentPell_CHG) the following model, which does not consider advertising and 
promotion variables, is constructed using stepwise variable selection. Variable inflation 
factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect from overfitting due to 
collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model (Grigsby, 2018).  
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The model is: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β5X5 + ε 
where, 
y is the change in percentage of Pell-eligible students within the first-year student 
cohort (PercentPell_CHG) during the year of a tuition reset 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is the amount of sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a 
percentage of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger 
negative coefficients. 
X3 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1 
(PercentPell_YearPrior). 
X4 is the year the tuition reset occurred (Year_of_Reset). This variable uses the year 
of the fall term when the new cohort entered. 
X5 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) which expressed 
as a percentage change in applications. A positive value for App_Trend indicates an 
increase in applications.  
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The first OLS linear regression model for R5—without consideration of 
advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 43 institutions with 
valid data. Table 17 presents the results: 
Table 17 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year Pell student enrollment without 
considering advertising 
  β Std. Error T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker -0.3905 0.2120 -1.8420 0.0736* 1.2679 
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT -33.6367 16.0577 -2.0950 0.0431** 1.2864 
PercentPell_YearPrior -0.3297 0.0940 -3.5070 0.0012*** 1.3744 
Year_of_Reset -0.7650 0.8196 -0.9330 0.3567 1.2690 
App_Trend -1.3289 2.4187 -0.5490 0.5860 1.4210 
N 43 F Statistic 4.796 (5,37) 
Adjusted R2 0.3113 p-value 0.0018 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively  
 
The results show evidence that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a 
statistically significant influence on changes in the percent of Pell-eligible first-year 
students (PercentPell_CHG). For each point sticker price elasticity of first-year students 
increases (demarcated by a negative number becoming larger) the percent change of first-
year students being Pell-eligible would increase by 0.3905%.  
Other significant predictor variables are the percent change of sticker price 
(StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) and percent Pell-eligible students in the year prior. 
(PercentPell_YearPrior). For each 1% reduction in sticker price 
(StickerPrice_CHG_PCT), the percent change in the percent of Pell-eligible students 
among members of the first-year cohort will increase 33.6367%. The existence of Pell-
eligible students prior to a tuition reset has a significant negative effect on the amount of 
change expected. Institutions with high percentages of Pell-eligible students tend to have 
smaller changes in the percent Pell-eligible students with a tuition reset in comparison to 
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those with lower percent Pell-eligible. This may be because they are already successfully 
accessing low-income market segments. 
The model’s p-value is 0.0018, which is significant even at the 1% level. The 
model explains 31.13% of the variance in the change in the percent of Pell-eligible 
students in the first-year cohort (PercentPell_CHG). The F Statistic is 4.796. 
The second model—which includes advertising variables—is as follows: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ β 5X5 + ε 
where, 
y is the change in percentage of Pell-eligible students within the first-year student 
cohort (PercentPell_CHG) during the year of a tuition reset 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines 
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an 
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures. 
X3 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1 
(PercentPell_YearPrior). 
X4 is the year the tuition reset occurred (Year_of_Reset). This variable uses the year 
of the fall term when the new cohort entered. 
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X5 is the of sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a 
percentage of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger 
negative coefficients. 
The second OLS linear regression model for R5—including consideration 
of advertising and promotion variables—is run on a sample of 38 institutions with 
valid data. Table 18 presents the results: 
Table 18 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year Pell student enrollment considering 
advertising 
  β Std. Error T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker -0.1384 0.2148 -0.6440 0.5240 1.0257 
AdvertsingPromotionSpend 
   YearPrior 
0.0000 0.0000 -3.4600 0.0016*** 1.0291 
PercentPell_YearPrior -0.1930 0.0665 -2.9010 0.0067*** 1.0466 
Year_of_Reset -1.8340 0.8803 -2.0830 0.0453** 1.2071 
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT -27.5300 14.0900 -1.9540 0.0595* 1.2012 
N 38 F Statistic 4.783 (5,32) 
Adjusted R2 0.3383 p-value 0.0022 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a significant 
predictor of change in the percent of an institution’s Pell-eligible population 
(PercentPell_CHG) for institutions implementing a tuition reset. However, significant 
predictors are the increased spending in advertising and promotion 
(AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior), the percent of first-year students who are Pell-
eligible in the year prior to a tuition reset (PercentPell_YearPrior), the year of the tuition 
reset, and the percent change in sticker price (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT). Although 
statistically significant, the effect size of increased advertising and promotion spending is 
very small (AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior). Like the prior model, the existence of 
Pell-eligible students prior to a tuition reset has a significant negative effect. For each 1% 
of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in the year prior to the reset, the 
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predicted change in Pell-eligible students in the first year of the reset declines by .1930%. 
As suggested earlier, institutions with high percentages of Pell-eligible students tend to 
have smaller changes in the percent Pell-eligible students with a tuition reset in 
comparison to those with lower percent Pell-eligible. For each 1% reduction in sticker 
price (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) the percent change in Pell-eligible students among 
members of the first-year cohort will increase 27.53%.  
The p-value is model is 0.0022, which is significant even at the 1% level. The 
model explains 33.83% of the variance in the change in the percent of Pell-eligible 
students in the first-year cohort (PercentPell_CHG), which is a slight improvement over 
the prior model. The F Statistic is 4.785, again substantially the same. 
Based on these models, there is only partial support that sticker price elasticity 
(PED_Sticker) is a statistically significant predictor of the percent change of Pell-eligible 
first-year students (PercentPell_CHG) enrolling at institutions implementing a tuition 
reset. The Percent Pell students prior to the reset (A lower percent the year prior would 
predict a larger increase), the amount of Sticker Price change (the greater the reduction 
the greater the increase in Pell), and year of reset (the earlier the reset year the greater the 
increase in Pell students) are more influential predictors. 
Research Question 6 
 Many private 4-year not-for-profit institutions recruit transfer students in addition 
to first-time, first-year students. Such transfers are a critical source of revenue in addition 
to first-year students. While transfer students value time-to-complete, 53% indicate 
financial concerns may interfere with their ability to finish (Hossler & Bontrager, 2014). 
Consistent with our findings in Phase 1, Lapovsky (2019) observed more than half of 
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institutions that implemented a tuition reset saw increased transfer student enrollment. 
The sixth research question is as follows:  
R6: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the 
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student 
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
To examine the influence of sticker price elasticity among transfer students 
(PED_Sticker_XFR) on changes in the percent change transfer student enrollment 
(XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) the following model without advertising and promotion 
variables is constructed using stepwise variable selection. Variable inflation factors (VIF) 
calculated on independent variables protect from overfitting due to collinearity. Only 
variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model (Grigsby, 2018). The first model 
which does not consider advertising and promotion variables is: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε 
where, 
y is the change in percentage of transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) 
during the year of a tuition reset 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year 
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-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A 
positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
X3 is Population density in the area within 100 miles of the campus implementing a 
tuition reset (X100Density). Population density is an estimate of the number of 
people living per square mile.  
X4 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1 
(PercentPell_YearPrior). 
The first OLS linear regression model for R6—without consideration of 
advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 47 institutions with 
valid data. Table 19 presents the results: 
Table 19 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in transfer student enrollment without 
considering advertising  
  β Std. Error T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker_XFR -0.0003 0.0054 -0.0550 0.9565 1.0808 
Change_in_Net_Assets 
_Ratio_YearPrior 
0.9095 0.3282 2.7710 0.0083*** 1.1321 
X100Density 0.0005 0.0002 2.5540 0.0144** 1.0887 
PercentPell_YearPrior 0.0065 0.0037 1.7250 0.0918* 1.1776 
N 47 F Statistic 4.623 (4,42) 
Adjusted R2 0.2395 p-value 0.0035 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity among transfer students 
(PED_Sticker_XFR) is a significant predictor of change in the percent of transfer 
students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) for institutions implementing a tuition reset. 
However, significant predictors are changes to net assets 
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), population density within 100 miles of the 
campus (X100Density), and the percent Pell-eligible students in the year prior to the reset 
(PercentPell_YearPrior). For each 1% increase in net assets 
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(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) the percent change in transfer students 
enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase .9095% (not a 2.3523 percentile 
increase). More populous regions better position institutions to see an increase in the 
number of transfer students enrolled. For each person increase in population density 
calculated within the region 100 miles of campus (X100Density), the percent change in 
transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase by 0.0004869%. 
Institutions that draw a higher percentage of their first-year student cohort from low-
income populations as shown by Pell eligibility are better positioned to see an increase in 
the percent change of transfer students enrolled. For each percent of Pell-eligible students 
in the first-year cohort during the year prior to a reset, the percent change in transfer 
students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) increases by .0065%.  
The model’s p-value is 0.0035, which is significant even at the 1% level. The 
model explains 23.95% of the variance in the percent change in transfer students 
enrolled. 
The second model—which includes advertising variables—is as follows: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ β 5X5 + ε 
where, 
y is the change in percentage of transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) 
during the year of a tuition reset 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
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X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines 
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an 
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures. 
X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year 
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A 
positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
X4 is Population density in the area within 100 miles of the campus implementing a 
tuition reset (X100Density). Population density is an estimate of the number of 
people living per square mile.  
X5 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1 
(PercentPell_YearPrior). 
The second OLS linear regression model for R6—without consideration of 
advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 31 institutions with 
valid data. Table 20 presents the results: 
Table 20 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in transfer student enrollment considering 
advertising  
  β Std. Error T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker_XFR -0.0139 0.0106 -1.3090 0.2023 1.3025 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT 0.4000 0.1049 3.8130 0.0008*** 1.2619 
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio 
_YearPrior 
1.4632 0.4121 3.5510 0.0016*** 1.1386 
X100Density 0.0007 0.0002 3.4570 0.0020*** 1.0936 
PercentPell_YearPrior 0.0022 0.0040 0.5440 0.5910 1.1576 
N 31 F Statistic 7.628 (5,25) 
Adjusted R2 0.5249 p-value 0.0002 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity among transfer students 
(PED_Sticker_XFR) is a significant predictor of change in the percent of transfer 
students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) for institutions implementing a tuition reset. 
However, significant predicts are increased spending in advertising and promotion 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT), changes to net assets 
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), and population density within 100 miles of 
the campus (X100Density). For each 1% increase in advertising and promotion spending 
in the year prior to a reset (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) the percent change in 
transfer student enrollment (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) increases by .4%. For each 1% 
increase in net assets (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) the percent change in 
transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase 1.4632%. More 
populous regions better position institutions to see an increase in the number of transfer 
students enrolled. For each person increase in population density calculated within the 
region 100 miles of campus (X100Density) the percent change in transfer students 
enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase by 0.0006578%. Given the introduction 
of advertising and promotion spending, the variable percent Pell-eligible students is no 
longer a statistically significant predictor.  
The model’s p-value is 0.0002, which is significant even at the 1% level. The 
model explains 52.49% of the variance in the percent change in transfer students 
enrolled, a substantive improvement over the first model. 
Based on these models, there is no evidence that Sticker Price Elasticity as 
measured in the years preceding a tuition reset would be a statistically significant 
predictor of transfer student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset. 
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However, consistent with the literature, the more vital an institution is (as measured by a 
positive change in net assets), the greater the population density within 100 miles, and the 
greater the percentage increase in advertising and promotion, the more transfer student 
enrollment would be expected to increase. 
Additional Findings 
The dataset compiled for this study also allows for preliminary analysis of other 
important questions academics and practitioners frequently ask about the effects of tuition 
resets. In this section we will examine questions pertaining to the size of a tuition reset, 
effects of a tuition reset on retention, and the effectiveness of tuition resets preceding and 
following the Great Recession. 
Amount of reset 
For many institutions considering a tuition reset, a natural assumption is larger 
tuition reset amounts will attract a greater number of enrolled students. The tuition reset 
amount should be sufficiently large to capture the attention of new populations of 
prospective students (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017). However, 
Table 21 presents no evidence of a direct correlation between the tuition reset amount 
expressed in dollars and common tuition reset outcomes such as changes in first-year 
students enrolled, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year enrolled, and the number of 
transfer students enrolled. For each outcome, the correlations are not significant at 10% 
for the p-value.  
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Table 21 
Correlation of sticker price change and reset outcomes 
Outcome Variable N t-value Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Pearson's 
product-
moment 
correlation 
p-value 
Enrolled Change 68 0.25 67 0.03 0.81 
Enrolled Change by Percent 69 1.12 68 0.13 0.27 
Net first-year Tuition and Fee 
Revenue Change 
56 0.44 55 0.06 0.66 
Net first-year Tuition and Fee 
Revenue Change by Percent 
56 -0.80 55 -0.11 0.43 
Transfer Enrolled Change 60 -0.83 59 -0.11 0.41 
Transfer Enrolled Change by Percent 60 0.78 59 0.10 0.44 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
The lack of correlation between sticker price and outcomes is also found when the 
reset amount is considered on a percentage basis, as shown in Table 22: 
Table 22 
Correlation of sticker price change by percent and reset outcomes 
Outcome Variable N t-value Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Pearson's 
product-
moment 
correlation 
p- 
value 
Enrolled Change 68 0.75 67 0.09 0.46 
Enrolled Change by Percent 69 0.95 68 0.11 0.35 
Net first-year Tuition and Fee 
Revenue Change 
56 0.78 55 0.10 0.44 
Net first-year Tuition and Fee 
Revenue Change by Percent 
56 -1.19 55 -0.16 0.24 
Transfer Enrolled Change 60 0.12 59 0.02 0.91 
Transfer Enrolled Change by Percent 60 0.14 59 0.02 0.89 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
However, simple correlations that assume linear relationships do not capture non-
linear threshold effects. Another way to look at the relationship between sticker price 
reductions and the likelihood of success is to examine if resets which are larger are 
successful—as defined by an enrollment increase of 5% or more prior to the year 
preceding the new lower sticker price—more frequently. Table 24 shows the number of 
institutions at varied increasing levels of sticker price reset amount. If there is a threshold 
effect, we would expect to see a low success percentage until we hit a certain size, and 
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then the percentage success would increase and continue to increase (as we have 
exceeded the threshold level).  
Unfortunately, no such effect is present in the current data set. In fact, there is no 
discernible pattern of enrollment success percent rates as the size of the reset increases; 
and if anything the cumulative percent success rate seems to decrease (From 63% success 
at resets up to $2,000 to 47% when all resets up to $17,999) as larger and larger reset 
amounts are considered as shown by Table 23: 
Table 23 
Cumulative tuition reset enrollment success rates by reset amount 
Reset Amount Number 
of 
Resets 
Enrollment 
Success 
Enrollment 
Success 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Count 
Cumulative 
Success 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Success 
Up to $2,000 16 10 63% 16 10 63% 
$2,000 to $3,999 19 7 37% 35 17 49% 
$4,000 to $5,999 18 9 50% 53 26 49% 
$6,000 to $7,999 4 0 0% 57 26 46% 
$8,000 to $9,999 7 5 71% 64 31 48% 
$10,000 to $11,999 2 1 50% 66 32 48% 
$12,000 to $13,999 4 0 0% 70 32 46% 
$14,000 to $15,999 1 1 100% 71 33 46% 
$16,000 to $17,999 1 1 100% 72 34 47% 
Note: Enrollment success is a 5% increase in first-year students over the year prior.  
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Given the lack of a threshold effect in terms of enrollment, it is unsurprising no threshold 
effects are observable when looking at net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students 
as seen in Table 24: 
Table 24 
Cumulative tuition reset FY net tuition and fee revenue success rates by reset amount 
Reset Amount Number 
of Resets 
Enrollment 
Success 
FY Net 
Revenue 
Success 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Count 
Cumulative 
Success 
Cumulative 
FY Net 
Revenue 
Success 
Percent 
Success 
Up to $2,000 16 8 50% 16 8 50% 
$2,000 to $3,999 19 2 11% 35 10 29% 
$4,000 to $5,999 18 5 28% 53 15 28% 
$6,000 to $7,999 4 0 0% 57 15 26% 
$8,000 to $9,999 7 4 57% 64 19 30% 
$10,000 to $11,999 2 0 0% 66 19 29% 
$12,000 to $13,999 4 1 25% 70 20 29% 
$14,000 to $15,999 1 1 100% 71 21 30% 
$16,000 to $17,999 1 1 100% 72 22 31% 
Note: FY net tuition and fee revenue success is a 5% or greater increase over the year prior. 
  
 With the current sample of 72 private not-for-profit institutions which have 
implemented a tuition reset, observations based on frequency distributions of tuition reset 
success rates do not lend support to a direct relationship between the size of the sticker 
price reduction and the likelihood of success; either through correlation analysis nor 
through observations of success percentages at different sizes of a tuition reset.  
Retention 
While most institutions cite recruitment and financial objectives as motivation to 
implement a tuition reset, effects on current student enrollment must also be considered 
(Casamento, 2016). Increasing retention of first-year students is a way to recuperate lost 
revenue from reduced per-student payments of full-pay and near full-pay continuing 
students. While IPEDS data do not allow direct analysis of tuition and fee revenues 
specific to continuing students, changes in first-year retention rates can be modeled from 
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information in this dataset. Of the 72 institutions in this study’s sample, 60 had valid 
retention data. The median change to retention was +2 percentage points and average 
change was +5 percentage points. 
Variable inflation factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect from 
overfitting due to collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model 
(Grigsby, 2018). To predict a percentage point change in retention, a multivariate OLS 
regression model is developed adding variables without consideration of advertising in a 
stepwise fashion as follows: 
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + ε 
where, 
y is the change in fall-to-fall first-year student’s retention (Retention_CHG) between 
the year prior to the reset and the first-year of the reset. 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year 
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A 
positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
X3 is the sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a percentage 
of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger negative 
coefficients. 
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The first OLS linear regression model for changes in retention, without 
consideration of advertising and promotion variables, runs on a sample of 48 
institutions with valid data. Table 25 shows the results: 
Table 25 
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student retention without 
considering advertising variables 
  β Std. Error T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker 0.1179 0.0866 1.3610 0.1804 1.0954 
Change_in_Net_Assets_
Ratio_YearPrior 
18.0865 6.6087 2.7370 0.0089*** 1.0057 
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT -29.2041 14.5477 -2.0070 0.0509* 1.0903 
N 48 F Statistic 4.157 (3,44) 
Adjusted R2 0.1677 p-value 0.0112 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of first-year 
students can be used to predict changes in first-year student retention (Retention_CHG). 
That said changes in net assets (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) and the 
percent of sticker price change (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) are found to be statistically 
significant predictors of changes in first-year student retention. For each 1% increase in 
net assets during the year prior to a tuition reset first-year student retention increases by 
18.0865%. For each 1% decrease in the sticker price, the first-year student retention rate 
will increase 29.2041%. 
The model’s p-value is 0.0112, which is significant at the 5% level. The model 
explains only 16.77% of the variance of the change in first-year student retention. The F 
statistic is 4.157. 
To predict a percentage point change in retention, a second multivariate OLS 
regression model is developed with consideration of advertising in a stepwise fashion as 
follows: 
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y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε 
where, 
y is the change in fall-to-fall first-year student’s retention (Retention_CHG) between 
the year prior to the reset and the first-year of the reset. 
α is the constant. 
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in 
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent 
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price. 
X2 is advertising and promotion change by percent 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) represents a percentage change in spending on 
the advertising and promotion lines of an institution’s Form 990 reporting which 
compares Year -1 to Year 0. A positive number represents increased advertising and 
promotion expenditures. 
X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition 
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year 
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A 
positive number indicates a growth in net assets. 
X4 is the sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a percentage 
of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger negative 
coefficients. 
The second OLS linear regression model for changes in retention with 
advertising and promotion variables runs on a sample of 31 institutions with valid 
data. Table 26 presents the results: 
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Table 26 
Linear regression analysis of change in first-year student retention considering advertising  
  β Std. Error T value p-value VIF 
PED_Sticker 0.4862 0.3188 1.5250 0.1393 1.2887 
Change_in_Net_Assets 
_Ratio_YearPrior 
38.5055 9.4326 4.0820 0.0004*** 1.1356 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT 3.8749 2.4496 1.5820 0.1258** 1.2261 
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT -29.7761 15.6196 -1.9060 0.0677* 1.0410 
N 31 F Statistic  6.234 (4,26) 
Adjusted R2 0.4110 p-value 0.0012 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
  
No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a significant 
predictor of change in first-year student fall-to-fall retention (Retention_CHG), but 
interestingly neither is advertising and promotion spending 
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT). Like the previous model changes in net assets 
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior ) and the percent of the sticker price change 
(StickerPrice_CHG_PCT ) are significant predictors of change in first-year student fall-to-
fall retention (Retention_CHG). For each percent increase in net assets during the year 
prior to a tuition reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), the percent change in 
retention (Retention_CHG) increases 38.5055%. For each percent decrease in sticker 
price (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT), the percent change in retention will increase by 29.7761% 
(Retention_CHG).  
The model’s p-value is 0.0112, which is significant at the 5% level. The model 
explains 41.10% of the variance of the change in first-year student retention, a 
substantive improvement over the prior model. The F statistic is 6.234, higher than the 
previous model. 
Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success 105 
The Great Recession and Tuition Resets 
In prior models, the year of reset was a predictor of the likelihood of increased net 
tuition and fee revenue from first-year students (R2) and had a statistically significant 
influence on the change in percent Pell-eligible students (R5). The number of tuition 
resets per year increased significantly following 2010. This time period corresponds to 
the end of the Great Recession (Clark, 2010; Grawe, 2018) but also renewed concerns 
surrounding student debt (Baum, 2016). It is natural to ask if tuition resets prior to 2010 
have been more successful than those preceding 2010. Table 27 compares the success 
rates of tuition resets preceding and following 2010:  
Table 27 
Tuition reset success preceding and following 2010 
  Resets 2002 to 2010 Resets 2011 to 2017 
Count 14 58 
Enrollment Success (1) 7 27 
Enrollment Success Percent 50.0% 46.6% 
Net Tuition and Fee Revenue Success (2) 5 17 
Net Tuition and Fee Revenue Success Percent 35.7% 29.3% 
Note: (1) Enrollment success is 5% or greater increase of first-year students in first-year of 
reset price 
(2) Net Tuition and Fee Revenue Success is 5% or greater increase in net tuition and fee 
revenue from first-year students in the first year of the reset price. 
  
Prior to 2010, 7 of 14 resets (50%) resulted in a 5% or greater increase in 
enrollment and 5 of 14 (or 36%) resulted in a 5% increase in net tuition and fee revenue 
from first-year students. Following 2010, 58 institutions implemented a tuition reset with 
27 increasing enrollments by 5% or more (46.6%) and 17 (or 29%) increased net tuition 
and fee revenue from first-year students. Despite the increased frequency of tuition resets 
after 2010, success rates are slightly lower. However, these differences are not 
statistically significant when analyzed with Welch Independent Samples T-Tests: 
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Table 28 
Tuition reset success preceding and following 2010, Independent samples t-test  
  Enrollment Success Net Tuition and 
Fee Success 
t-value -0.35 0.01 
Degrees of Freedom 17.65 19.23 
p-value 0.73 0.99 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
The evidence then is that there is no statistically significant difference in success 
rates prior to or following 2010. 
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Chapter 5 - Discussion 
 Chapter 5 contextualizes findings from Chapter 4 to the research purpose and 
goals. The chapter begins with a summary of the study including research purpose, 
problem, and specific research questions. The chapter then outlines major findings and 
applies these to discussions of theory and the profession. The chapter then documents the 
limitations of the study and provides suggestions for further research. The chapter ends 
with concluding thoughts.  
Summary of the Study  
The traditional high price and high discount model which has dominated higher 
education more and more is coming to be considered unsustainable (Lederman & Seltzer, 
2017; Pryor, 2017). In response, an increasing number of institutions are considering 
implementing tuition resets (Kantrowitz, 2019) wherein the published sticker price is 
reduced, but also accompanied by a roughly commensurate reduction in financial aid. 
The net price students pay remains essentially the same (Bernard, 2019). However, 
results to date have been mixed (Bloom, 2017; Seltzer, 2017a). 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between measures of 
sticker price elasticity and the change in first-year student enrollment, net tuition and fee 
revenue from first-year students, first-year students who are Pell-eligible, and transfer 
students enrolled following a tuition reset using multivariate logistic and linear regression 
models.  
The main independent variable of interest is sticker price sensitivity as measured 
by the sticker price elasticity of demand (Bradley & Singell Jr., 2010; Farhan, 2016) in 
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the two years prior to the announcement of the reset event. The dependent variables 
stemming from industry dialog (Bloom, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015) are 
increased first-year students enrollment, increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-
year students, increase in the percentage of Pell-eligible students in the first-year cohort, 
increase in transfer students enrollment, likelihood the tuition reset will increase first-year 
student enrollment, and likelihood the tuition reset will increase net tuition and fee 
revenue from first-year students. The effects of increased advertising and promotion 
spending was introduced as an intervening variable (S. Bodfish, personal communication, 
May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Kumar, 2005; Lapovsky, 2015). 
The research questions this study looked to address were as follows: 
1. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in first-year student enrollment 
for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
2. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net tuition and fee revenue 
from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
3. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student enrollment for institutions 
implementing a tuition reset? 
4. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year 
students for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
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5. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in the percent of first-year Pell-eligible student 
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset? 
6. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a 
tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student enrollment for institutions 
implementing a tuition reset? 
As discussed in the literature review, many practitioners emphasize the role of 
advertising in a successful tuition reset. For each of the above research questions, this 
study examines the intervening effects of changes in advertising spending and indicators 
of financial health. 
To explore these questions, a quantitative analysis of 72 private not-for-profit, 4-
year or above institutions was conducted from a larger list of 142 resets. These 
institutions implemented tuition resets between the academic years 2003-2004 and 2017-
2018. Data regarding these institutions and their resets was assembled from IPEDS, Form 
990 data, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Of these 72 institutions, advertising and promotion 
expenditure information was provided for 43.  
Major Findings  
The major findings of this study were presented in three parts: a review of 
frequency distributions which provide documentation of the types of institutions which 
implement tuition resets and catalog the outcomes realized, findings that pertain directly 
to the research questions this study sought to address, and additional findings which can 
seed future research or be of special interest to industry practitioners. 
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Frequency Distributions 
A major contribution of this study is to characterize institutions implementing 
tuition resets and the breadth of results these institutions have realized. Among the 72 
private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions analyzed, the average tuition reset 
amount was 18% of the sticker price, and the average tuition amount reset expressed in 
dollars was $4,967.  
The focus of this study is the role of sticker price elasticity as a predictor of 
tuition reset success. This study assumes institutions seek to implement tuition resets 
because of perceived student sticker-price sensitivity; expressed by a sticker-price 
elasticity of -1 or lower. However, at the institution recruitment population level, the 
range of sticker price elasticity for first-year students (from -3.37 to 4.07) and transfer 
students (from -1.77 to 5.04) of institutions implementing a tuition reset provides 
evidence of a wide range of behavioral responses to sticker price in the years preceding a 
tuition reset, including responses reflecting Veblen effects wherein higher prices would 
be expected to increase demand.  
Many institutions implementing tuition resets reflect low levels of financial 
health. According to the analysis of Form 990 data, the interquartile range of FIT scores 
for institutions implementing a tuition reset ranged from 0.40 (should perform a thorough 
review of institutional effectiveness) to 3.86 (significant changes needed to achieve 
mission) (The Austen Group, 2019b) on a scale from -4 to 10.  
 Institutions implementing tuition resets realized a wide range of outcomes that 
underscore both the significant risks and potential rewards. In terms of increased 
enrollment of first-year students, the median outcome was 0% and the average was 
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+19%. In terms of net revenue from first-year students, the median outcome was a 4% 
loss and an average gain of 19%. The median results of other important outcomes were a 
1 percentage point increase in the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible, 2 
percentage point increase in first-year student retention, and a 6% increase in transfer 
students enrolled. Institutions looking to implement a tuition reset should be clear on their 
goals and the results they would like to achieve. 
Institutions implementing tuition resets assume significant levels of risk. Among 
the 72 institutions that implemented a tuition reset the 25th percentile (which represents 
the outcome of 1 in 4 institutions that implement a tuition reset) outcomes indicate a 
decline in applications of 7% or more, yield on admitted students declined by 4% or 
more, discount rates increases by 3% or more (indicating a reduction of both sticker price 
and net price), enrollment of first-year students declines by 12% or more, and net revenue 
from first-year students decreases by 26% or more. No one institution realized all these 
negative effects, but if any particular institution realizes one or more of these effects, it 
could be difficult to recover. Institutions planning to implement a tuition reset should 
carefully consider their risk threshold and options to mitigate potential negative 
consequences. 
Research questions 
The six research questions, as well as an additional finding pertaining to retention, 
focus on the role of sticker price elasticity as a statistically significant predictor of various 
dimensions of success for institutions implementing a tuition reset. Table 29 summarizes 
the findings after examining models that both exclude and include the advertising and 
promotion spending variables. 
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In short, sticker price elasticity in the years preceding a tuition reset is a weak 
predictor of success for institutions looking to implement a tuition reset. Sticker price 
elasticity was a significant predictor of tuition reset success only when the change in 
advertising and promotion spending was considered (R1A). Sticker price elasticity was 
also a significant predictor of a percent Pell increase when advertising was not 
considered. For all other research questions, sticker price elasticity was not a significant 
factor in explaining the likelihood of success or other levels of the examined outcome 
variables. 
From this study, however, we found the percent change in advertising and 
promotion spending is positively associated with many important tuition reset outcomes: 
the likelihood of increased enrollment, the likelihood of increasing net tuition and fee 
revenue from first-year students, the percent change in enrollment, the percent change in 
net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, and change in first-year student 
retention rate. For all research questions, the addition of advertising and promotion 
variables strengthened the explanatory power of models. These findings confirm evidence 
from earlier qualitative studies that institutions need to invest in promoting reasons for 
the tuition reset and how it benefits students. 
Similarly, we found evidence that the change in net assets ratio was positively 
associated with increases in enrollment, increases in net tuition and fee revenue, and 
increases in first-year student retention. Such evidence is consistent with findings from 
qualitative studies that institutions implementing tuition resets should do so from a 
position of growing financial vitality, rather than as an effort to reverse financial decline.  
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Other Findings 
Institutions implementing a tuition reset often ask about the right amount of a 
tuition reset with the expectation a larger tuition reset will attract more attention than a 
smaller one. This study found no correlation between the size of a tuition reset (in either 
absolute dollar terms or as a percentage of the sticker price) and outcomes in terms of 
enrollment or net tuition and fees from first-year students. This study also found no 
evidence of a “threshold amount” (in either absolute dollar terms or as a percentage of the 
sticker price) wherein outcomes in terms of enrollment or net tuition and fees from first-
year students changed significantly after a certain amount was cut. These findings are 
contrary to those beliefs held by intuitions that resets need to be of a certain size to attract 
attention and underscore the need for advertising.  
Many institutions implementing a tuition reset experienced an increase in 
retention. Models to predict this increase in first-year student retention show the 
statistically significant influence of Change in Net Assets Ratio and percent change in 
advertising and promotion spending change. The influence of sticker price elasticity was 
not significant.  
Despite a notable increase in the number of tuition resets attempted annually 
FY2011 and following, no statistically significant difference was found between the 
success rates of tuition resets prior to or following 2010 when assessing a 5% or greater 
increase in first-year student enrollment or increase of net tuition and fee revenue from 
first-year students.  
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Implications for Theory  
The study of tuition resets is an emerging field. Building upon previous 
qualitative and quantitative studies, this is the most comprehensive study to date of 
tuition resets by the number of tuition resets considered and breath of data elements 
incorporated into the analysis. This study investigates a list of 142 institutions that 
implemented the tuition reset strategy between the 1996-1997 academic year and 2020-
2021. Further, this study supplies a deeper analysis of 72 4-year, not-for-profit institutions 
that implemented a reset between the 2003-2004 and 2017-2018 academic years for 
which more extensive data is available. From these 72 institutions, 43 provided 
advertising and promotion spending information on Form 990s. Kottich’s (2017) 
quantitative examination of tuition resets, the largest previous quantitative study, 
examined results from 45 private not-for-profit 4-year institutions.  
Similar to Kottich’s (2017) use of IPEDS and Form 990 data to analyze the results 
of a tuition reset, this study added U.S. Census Bureau data to consider factors of 
population and population density. This study also included the use of advertising and 
promotion spending from Form 990s. Future researchers can review the tuition reset lists 
compiled in this study and add analysis of further resets as publicly available data sets are 
extended with annual updates. 
This study extends literature about the effects of price as a quality signal in higher 
education. Tuition resets offer a natural experiment by which researchers can contrast the 
influence of sticker price and net price on a purchase decision. This study found no direct 
relationship between change in sticker price and the enrollment or net tuition and fee 
revenues realized in the first year of the reset. However, sticker price change by percent 
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was a significant predictor of the proportion of first-year students who are Pell-eligible 
(without considering advertising and promotion spending) and increases in first-year 
student retention rates. These findings suggest the direct influence of sticker price may be 
greater on low-income families.  
The findings of this study underscore the central role of advertising and 
promotion investment in the tuition reset process. Increased spending in advertising and 
promotions in the year prior to the tuition reset was positively associated with many 
important outcomes as shown in Chapter 4. However, the size of the sticker price 
reduction and price sensitivity of prospective students have weaker or no effects. On this 
basis, the tuition reset announcement should be seen as a marketing opportunity to both 
build brand awareness (Bodfish, 2017) and change the price position of the institution 
relative to known competitors (Shirai, 2015). Changing sticker price alone has little 
effect, changing the price in conjunction with a clear and compelling explanation for an 
unexpected price reduction does (Dolan & Simon, 1996; Shirai, 2015). Advertising and 
promotion investment also allows the resetting institution to explain the rationale behind 
a tuition reset, reconcile any dissonance of a lower price position with expectations for 
high quality, reconcile messages of affordability with a strategy that moves towards price 
transparency, and frames the competitive set to which an institution should continue to be 
compared. 
Implications for the Profession  
Tuition resets involve significant risk and are far from a quick fix to difficult 
recruitment trends faced by many institutions. The distribution frequencies section of this 
study demonstrates that many institutions implementing tuition resets have experienced 
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negative outcomes including decreases in applications, lower first-year enrollment, and 
losses in net tuition and fee revenue. Institutions with weak financial health compound 
the severity of these risks as their ability to absorb a negative outcome is less. But many 
institutions also realize gains by these same measures. Institutions considering a tuition 
reset, then, are well-advised to note the risks involved and consider their capacity to 
withstand one or more of these negative outcomes. 
Beyond a general description of the outcomes of a tuition reset, enrollment 
professionals and consultants would like to know if they should consider implementing a 
tuition reset at a specific institution. Models developed in this study are not sufficiently 
predictive to make a determinative recommendation if an institution should go ahead with 
a reset, but they do show factors that can help institutions rule out the implementation of 
the strategy. 
First, this study found institutions implementing tuition resets often have students 
that do not exhibit sticker price-sensitive behavior at the population level. Institutions 
need to have a detailed understanding of how their specific students will respond to 
changes in sticker price prior to implementing a tuition reset. This finding highlights the 
need for student-level price sensitivity analysis in the years preceding a tuition reset. 
Such market research quantifies the independent influence of cost of attendance (at reset, 
normal or higher levels) and financial aid has on the decision of sub-populations to enroll 
at a specific institution (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Carter & 
Curry, 2011; Casamento, 2016).  
Second, this study found that a change in net assets in the year prior 
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) to a reset is one of the most consistent 
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independent variables (R3, R4, R6, Retention) associated with levels of enrollment and 
net tuition and fee revenue increase. Tuition resets help institutions with growing net 
assets. Institutions with a lower or negative change in net asset ratios may see unexpected 
negative outcomes. Consistent with earlier qualitative studies, institutions should be 
financially healthy before the implementation of a tuition reset (Casamento, 2016; 
Kottich, 2017; Lawlor, 2016). 
 Third, this study found a positive correlation between changes in advertising 
spending and some important tuition reset outcome measures such as an increase in first-
year student enrollment, an increase in net tuition and fee revenue, and an increase in 
transfer student enrollment. Institutions considering a tuition reset need to prepare to 
make a significant investment in marketing and advertising to promote the reset. 
Institutions that fail to make a substantive investment in advertising and promotion not 
only secure a financial loss from full-pay continuing students but also risk neglecting 
opportunities to benefit from the price reduction. Prospective students and parents who 
no longer consider an institution based on sticker price need to be told they should take 
another look because of news of the reset. Students and parents already considering the 
reset need to be told the rationale for the reset lest they perceive quality will suffer as a 
result. 
Limitations 
Known limitations constrain this research: 
First, IPEDS has known lags in reporting, as mentioned previously. If an 
institution takes its fall enrollment census in October of year 0, it will not be publicly 
visible in IPEDS until 15-24 months later. This lag was a major reason why this study is 
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limited to 72 private not-for-profit institutions with sufficient IPEDS data available. This 
is the largest sample size of existing academic studies of tuition resets known by the 
author. 
Second, statistically, only a small number of institutions perform tuition resets 
each year. While the event-study methodology allowed us to investigate the effects of a 
tuition reset based on the full sample size, the results depend upon the proper controlling 
for the influence of outliers. The small sample size prohibited splitting the sample data 
file to test for overfitting in the logistic regression models. The available sample size for 
future studies will increase as the number of institutions implementing tuition resets in 
the future increases. With larger sample sizes, the statistical robustness and reliability of 
quantitative methods available increases. 
Third, little has been written from an academic perspective on the phenomenon of 
tuition resets. Because of this gap in documented literature, greater reliance upon 
theoretical concepts and analogy from other industries were used to interpret observed 
trends in higher education, which leaves some potential for error.  
Fourth, the sample for this study was only institutions that implemented a tuition 
reset. Future studies can name a parallel peer group by criteria under investigation (e.g. 
institution size by enrollment, operating budget, institutional control) and attribute 
changes to the tuition reset compared to other factors affecting the private not-for-profit 
sector. 
Fifth, the study focuses on the outcomes from first-year students. Full break-even 
analysis of a tuition reset should consider the financial impact from transfer and 
continuing students as well. Secondary data sources such as IPEDS and Form 990s does 
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not provide data suitable for analyzing these issues. Institutions report tuition, fees, room 
and board at the institutional level, without separation between continuing, first-year, and 
transfer students. Rather than analyzing data at the institutional level, data would need to 
be collected at the student level for each institution. 
The findings of this study are generalizable only to private 4-year not-for-profit 
institutions. Public institutions may reset for different reasons than private institutions 
(e.g. under mandates from governing bodies, compliance with state funding mandates) 
and have different goals as a result. Tuition resets for specific academic degrees and 
programs are not within the scope of this study and face different communications 
challenges. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 More and more institutions announce tuition resets each year. However, evidence 
from this study supports the previous findings that tuition resets involve significant risks. 
Further research will help institutions improve their understanding of risks involved and 
outline criteria wherein implementation of a tuition reset will increase the enrollment of 
first-year students, transfer students, and improve both retention and net tuition and fee 
revenue. 
Tuition resets are still a recent phenomenon and require further study. The 
direction of such research can include profiling institutions considering a reset (e.g. 
predicting which institutions will implement a reset), identifying factors that predict 
successful tuition resets, and describing how tuition resets impact aspects of an 
institution's profile and/or segments of students).  
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Studies that predict which institutions will implement a tuition reset could look 
more closely at the institutional size (enrollment and annual operating budget) and quality 
of student body (selectivity, average test scores) which are often cited reference points of 
college presidents and enrollment management professionals. This study documented 
wide variations by BEA Statistical region in the number of tuition resets implemented but 
did not attempt to explain this variance. Future studies could look at regional variances 
and seek to explain why the tuition reset strategy is more attractive in some regions (e.g. 
number of colleges, the income of families in the region, demographic trends, type of 
dominant competitors). 
Future studies about tuition resets should identify and characterize drivers for 
successful tuition reset outcomes. Factors that lead an institution to consider a tuition 
reset may or may not also lead to the successful execution of that strategy. Future studies 
then can also test institution size (e.g. by enrollment or annual tuition revenue) and the 
academic profile of students (e.g. through test scores) as factors that portend successful 
outcomes.  
This study found no evidence of a direct relationship between the size of the 
tuition reset and increase in enrollment despite the expectation that a larger tuition reset 
amount would attract more attention than a smaller amount. Future research should 
explore why evidence to date runs contrary to this expectation. Future research should 
focus on the relationship between tuition reset reduction amount, level of advertising 
given inquiry pool size, and efficacy of different tuition reset messages (e.g. affordability 
emphasis or transparency emphasis). This final point bears more explanation.  
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Because tuition resets create a meaning paradox (lower sticker price, higher 
quality, but the same net price), the burden falls on the institution to explain the rationale 
for the tuition reset. Future studies can test specific messaging themes (e.g. affordability, 
value, transparency, revitalized brand, association with capital campaigns) coded from 
tuition reset announcements for correlation with positive tuition reset outcomes.  
Future studies should also describe how tuition resets impact aspects of an 
institution's profile and/or segments of students). The impact of tuition resets on 
continuing students continues to be an under-discussed consideration. This study, 
consistent with Kottich (2017) finds institutions that conducted a tuition reset 
experienced an increase in retention. A multiple case-study approach that considers both 
financial and attitudinal information could shed important light on how institutions 
performing tuition resets can make plans to ensure current students are retained and can 
assist in future recruitment efforts. Researchers do not yet understand the impact of 
tuition resets on other factors such as student satisfaction and graduation rates. More 
research will clarify how tuition resets impact recognized drivers of retention, especially 
when financial aid packages for continuing students are frequently reduced in dollar 
amount. 
Tuition resets are also frequently proposed as a strategy to attract lower-income 
students (Davis, 2003; Rine, 2016). This study shows that the percent of Pell-eligible 
students in a first-year cohort on average increased by 1% at the median and average. 
This study also found the change in Pell-eligible student enrollments is associated with 
the size of the sticker price change, the number of Pell-eligible students already in the 
first-year cohort, and the year of the reset. Future studies can look at whether changes in 
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the percent Pell-eligible students continues to increase in the years following a reset, and 
whether Pell-eligible students pay less following a reset. 
Finally, this study primarily sought to understand the major effects of a tuition 
reset in the first year of the reset. A major conversation in the industry relates to whether 
the benefits of a tuition reset persist beyond the first-year. Future studies can compare the 
results from the first-year with outcomes in later years. 
Conclusions and Final Thoughts  
At a time when researchers and practitioners are questioning the dominant model 
of higher education pricing—tuition discounting—an increasing number of institutions 
are considering the tuition reset strategy. Proponents of the tuition reset point to 
advantages in terms of perceived affordability, price transparency, and college access. 
Critics impugn it as an ineffective and deceptive marketing tactic as net price stays about 
the same. This study has shown evidence that the tuition reset strategy is risky, but some 
institutions have successfully implemented it. Whether an institution opts to reset or 
continue to discount tuition at a high-price and high discount level, the pricing strategy 
needs to accurately communicate the institution’s quality to prospective students.  
Colleges often reference concerns of prospective students about high published 
prices for higher education as a primary reason to implement a tuition reset. A rational 
and compassionate response to such concern about prices is to reduce the published price 
and show commitment to affordability and transparency in pricing. However, this study 
found sticker price sensitivity as measured by sticker price elasticity has no significant 
effect on the tuition reset outcomes. Of the 12 models developed in response to the six 
research questions, sticker price elasticity was only a statistically significant predictor for 
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the likelihood of success of enrollment increase when used in conjunction with increase 
in advertising spending. Sticker price elasticity was also a predictor for the increase in the 
proportion of first-year Pell recipients in a first-year class when not considering changes 
in advertising spending. 
Additionally, the tuition reset amount itself seems to be of lesser importance. 
Sticker price change (in dollars) was not a significant predictor for most outcomes. The 
sticker price change by percent variable was significant only in predicting a change in the 
proportion of Pell-eligible students following the reset (the larger the reduction, the 
greater the percentage increase in the proportion of Pell-eligible students). Although 
limited by small samples at higher tuition reset amounts, examination of success rates did 
not suggest the existence of threshold sizes of reduction amounts to increase the chances 
of successfully implementing a tuition reset. 
While sticker price elasticity and the amount of tuition reduction were not 
significant predictors for tuition reset success, change promotion and advertising 
expenditures as reported on Form 990s was. A percentage increase in advertising 
spending was a significant factor in determining the likelihood of enrollment success, the 
likelihood of increased net revenue from first-year students, change in first-year student 
enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, the proportion of Pell-
eligible first-year students and first-year student retention. These results underscore the 
need to invest in an overarching brand strategy and communications plan which explains 
the rationale behind and benefits of a tuition reset which had been emphasized in 
qualitative studies (Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015) and practitioners consulting in 
this area (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Lawlor, 2016). 
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Consistent with previous qualitative studies (S. Bodfish, personal communication, 
May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016), tuition resets are more likely to have successful 
outcomes when the institution is thriving. Increases in net assets in the year leading into 
the announcement of a tuition reset is associated with increases in first-year student 
enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, transfer student 
enrollment, and first-year student retention. On this basis, tuition resets should be seen as 
a component in a wider brand repositioning strategy, not as a pricing tactic to reverse the 
decline. The pricing strategy needs to accurately communicate the benefits of an 
institution in terms that prospective students value. 
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Appendix A 
Following is a listing of institutions considered in the preparation of this study, including information regarding institutional context and information sources to document the tuition reset. The final column indicates if there is 
enough data available to include each institution in one or more substantial components of analysis outlined in this proposal. Following the table of institutions, a list of website links is provided which document online lists of 
tuition resets and announcements of specific tuition resets for institutions listed. 
Table A1                     
List of institutions implementing a tuition 
reset 
    
                
Institution Name First Year of 
New Tuition 
Sector Notes Cappex NAICU Edvisors Kottich Web 
Search 
IPEDS 
Data 
Use in 
analysis 
Waldorf College (IA) (Now Waldorf 
University) 
1987-1988 Private for-profit,  
4-year or above 
  X   X         
Muskingum College (OH) 1996-1997 Private not-for-profit   X   X         
North Carolina Wesleyan College (NC) 1996-1997 Private not-for-profit   X   X         
Bluefield College 1998-1999 Private not-for-profit   X   X         
Pine Manor College (MA) 1998-1999 Private not-for-profit   X   X         
Sheldon Jackson College (AK) 1998-1999 Private not-for-profit Closed in 2007 X   X         
Thiel College (PA) 1998-1999 Private not-for-profit   X   X         
College of William & Mary (Richard Bland 
College of William and Mary) (VA) 
1999-2000 Public, 2-year   X   X         
Marlboro College (VT) 1999-2000 Private not-for-profit   X   X         
University of Virginia (VA) 1999-2000 Public   X   X         
Wells College (NY) 1999-2000 Private not-for-profit   X   X         
Bethany College (WV) 2002-2003 Private not-for-profit   X   X   X     
Heidelberg University 2002-2003 Private not-for-profit Heidelberg College to Heidelberg University (2009) X   X       X 
Waldorf College (University) 2003-2002 Private for-profit,  
4-year or above 
  X   X         
Abilene Christian University (TX)  2003-2004 Private not-for-profit 1 program X   X         
The College of Idaho (Albertson College) 2003-2004 Private not-for-profit   X   X       X 
Westminster College (MO) 2003-2004 Private not-for-profit   X   X       X 
Eureka College (IL) 2004-2005 Private not-for-profit   X   X       X 
Lourdes University 2004-2005 Private not-for-profit               X 
Salem International University 2004-2005 Private for-profit,  
4-year or above 
                
North Park University (IL) 2005-2006 Private not-for-profit   X   X   X   X 
Roosevelt University 2005-2006 Private not-for-profit               X 
Amridge University 2006-2007 Private not-for-profit Name change to Regions University from Southern 
Christian University in 2006; then name change to 
Amridge University in 2008 
            X 
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South Dakota Colleges (SD) 2006-2007 Public Out-of-state only X   X         
Blackburn College (IL) 2008-2009 Private not-for-profit   X   X Y X   X 
North Park University 2008-2009 Private not-for-profit               X 
Warner Pacific College 2008-2009 Private not-for-profit         Y       
Davis & Elkins College 2009-2010 Private not-for-profit 1% reduction   X         X 
Penn Foster College 2009-2010 Private not-for-profit Online, 28% X   X         
William Jessup University 2009-2010 Private not-for-profit     X     X   X 
Baptist Bible College (MO) 2010-2011 Private not-for-profit         Y     X 
Rabbinical College of Telshe (OH) 2010-2011 Private not-for-profit 7% cut         X     
Waldorf College (University) 2010-2011 Private for-profit,  
4-year or above 
            X   
Beis Medrash Heichal Dovid (Far Rockaway, 
NY):  
2011-2012 Private not-for-profit     X   Y X   X 
Bluefield College (VA) 2011-2012 Private not-for-profit 25% for working adults   X           
Brewton-Parker College (GA) 2011-2012 Private not-for-profit   X X   Y X   X 
Davis College 2011-2012 Private not-for-profit 13.8% reduction X X   Y X   X 
John Wesley University (NC) 2011-2012 Private not-for-profit               X 
Sewanee-The University of the South (TN) 2011-2012 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y X   X 
Urbana University (Urbana, OH): 2011-2012 Private not-for-profit  50 percent for online intersession courses   X           
Burlington College 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit Summer 2012 - 25 percent discount for summer 
semester 
X   X         
Cabrini College (PA) 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit Name change to Cabrini University in 2016 X X X Y X   X 
Cleary University (MI) 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit         Y       
Duquesne University (PA) 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit School of education only X X           
Jarvis Christian College 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit         Y X   X 
Lincoln College 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y X   X 
Montreat College 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit               X 
Our Lady of Holy Cross College (University 
of Holy Cross) 
2012-2013 Private not-for-profit               X 
Patten University 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit Formerly Oakland Bible Institute               
Regent University 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit 20% of undergraduate online   X           
Seton Hall University 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit $21,000 for high achieving students X X X   X     
University of Charleston 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit 22% for freshman and transfer students X X X Y X   X 
William Peace University 2012-2013 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y     X 
Alfred University (NY) 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit           X   X 
Allen University 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit               X 
Ancilla College 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit,  
2-year 
          X     
Belmont Abbey College 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y     X 
Central Christian College of Kansas 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit               X 
City University of Seattle 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit                 
Concordia University-Saint Paul 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y X   X 
Cox College 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit               X 
Harrison College 2013-2014 Private for-profit (IN, OH, NC, Online) (9 programs) X   X         
Hiwassee College 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit more than        Y X   X 
Life Pacific College 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit               X 
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Life University 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit               X 
Manhattanville College 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit                 
Martin University 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit               X 
Mid-Continent University 2013-2014 Private, not-for-profit 2014 - Bankruptcy               
Saint Louis Christian College 2013-2014 Private not-for-profit   X     Y     X 
Alaska Pacific University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y X   X 
Ashland University (OH) 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y X   X 
Ave Maria University (FL) 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X     Y X   X 
Bethune-Cookman University (FL) 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit         Y       
Converse College 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y X   X 
Friends University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit Actually, NOT a reset, it’s a tuition guarantee plan         X     
Lesley University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X     Y X   X 
National Louis University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X           X 
Ohio Northern University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X X X Y X   X 
Pacific States University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X           X 
Piedmont International University (NC) 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit Winston-Salem, NC X     Y     X 
Prescott College 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit         Y X   X 
Seton Hall University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit Reduced tuition to $22,500 for freshmen.   X           
Southern Virginia University 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit reduced tuition by 23 percent X X   Y     X 
St Vincent's College 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X     Y     X 
Wilson College 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit   X     Y     X 
York College of Pennsylvania 2014-2015 Private not-for-profit           X     
Boston Baptist College (MA) 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit   X     Y     X 
College of Mount Saint Vincent 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit Followed by 56% increase X     Y X   X 
Everest University (FL, MO) 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit Various campuses owned by Zenith Education Group 
as of 2015; formerly owned by for-profit Corinthian 
Colleges. 
X             
Grace College and Theological Seminary 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit         Y X   X 
Holy Apostles College and Seminary (CT) 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit         Y     X 
Lewis and Clark State College 2015-2016 Public After 49% increase in 2014-2015 X             
Lincoln Christian University 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit   X     Y     X 
National Louis University 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit Followed tuition reduction in 2014-2015 X           X 
Northwood University-Texas 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit               X 
Paul Quinn College 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit   X     Y     X 
St. Vincent’s College (CT) 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit Followed tuition reduction in 2014-2015 X     Y     X 
Stephen F. Austin State University (TX) 2015-2016 Public   X             
Stillman College 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit   X     Y X   X 
University of North Texas (TX) 2015-2016 Public OK residents only X   X         
Wilberforce University (OH) 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit   X           X 
Wilmington College 2015-2016 Private not-for-profit   X     Y     X 
Burlington College (VT) 2016-2017 Private not-for--profit 9 percent reduction [Closed May 2016]   X   Y X     
Central Washington University 2016-2017 Public   X             
Eastern Washington University 2016-2017 Public   X             
Evergreen State College 2016-2017 Public   X             
Iowa Wesleyan University (IA) 2016-2017 Private not-for-profit         Y       
Lewis and Clark State College 2016-2017 Public   X             
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Pima Community College (AZ) 2016-2017 Public, 2-year Out-of-state and internationals only X             
Rosemont College 2016-2017 Private not-for-profit   X X   Y X   X 
Rutgers University – Camden (NJ) 2016-2017 Public Low- and middle- income NJ residents only X       X     
University of Bridgeport (CT)  2016-2017 Private not-for-profit (In-State) reduced tuition for in-state students to 
$18,500 
  X     X     
University of St. Joeseph (CT) 2016-2017 Private not-for-profit 29 percent reduction in room and board   X         X 
University of Washington (WA) 2016-2017 Public   X             
Utica College 2016-2017 Private not-for-profit   X X   Y X     
Washington State University (WA) 2016-2017 Public   X             
Western Washington University (WA) 2016-2017 Public   X             
College of St. Mary (Omaha, NE) 2017-2018 Private not-for-profit   X X   Y X   X 
Columbia College (SC) 2017-2018 Private not-for-profit         Y X   X 
Immaculata University (PA) 2017-2018 Private not-for-profit   X X   Y X   X 
La Salle University (PA) 2017-2018 Private not-for-profit   X X   Y X   X 
Marian University (Fond du Lac, WI) 2017-2018 Private not-for-profit     X     X   X 
University of Southern Mississippi (MS) 2017-2018 Public Out of state only X             
Avila University 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X X           
Benedict College (SC) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit     X     X     
Birmingham-Southern College (AL) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X X     X     
Canisius College, Buffalo, NY 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit     X     X     
Champlain College Online (VT) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit Career-focused adult higher education (Online) 50% 
tuition reduction 
        X     
Cleary University 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit Public service workers only         X     
Cleveland Institute of Music (OH) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X       X     
College of St. Joseph (VT) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit           X     
Colorado Mountain College 2018-2019 Public           X     
Cornerstone University (MI) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X       X     
Drew University (NJ) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X       X     
Eastern Nazarene College 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit           X     
Elizabeth City State University 2018-2019 Public           X     
Glenville State College 2018-2019 Public           X     
Mills College (CA) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X X     X     
Seton Hall University 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit           X     
Sweet Briar College 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X X     X     
The Masters University (CA) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit Announced with affirmation of mission, new majors, 
success in athletics, and a new capital campaign. 
        X     
University of Detroit Mercy 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit     X     X     
University of North Carolina, Pembroke 2018-2019 Public           X     
University of Sioux Falls (Sioux Falls, SD) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit     X     X     
University of the Sciences (PA) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit   X X     X     
Warner Pacific University (formerly College) 2018-2019 Private not-for-profit     X     X     
Western Carolina University 2018-2019 Public           X     
Albright College 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit     X           
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The following list of websites document both specific institutional tuition resets, but also lists of institutions that have implemented this strategy. Major sources as reflected in the table above are in bold typeface: 
 http://belmontabbeycollege.edu/admissions/home-school/explore/tuition-and-fees/tuition-reset/ 
 http://homernews.com/homer-news/business/2013-05-22/alaska-pacific-university-cuts-tuition-by-30-percent 
 http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/pf/1111/gallery.colleges_lower_tuition/2.html 
 http://relevantscience.blogspot.com/2012/07/38-colleges-lowering-their-tuition.html 
 http://www.al.com/news/tuscaloosa/index.ssf/2015/01/stillman_college_reducing_tuit.html 
 http://www.benedict.edu/cms/?q=node/1481 
 http://www.capitalgazette.com/news/annapolis/ac-cn-st-johns-college-tuition-0913-story.html 
 http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2013/08/ashland_university_will_reduce.html 
 http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/09/cleveland_institute_of_music_t.html 
 http://www.collegegold.com/applydecide/tuitionfreezelist 
 http://www.drew.edu/admissions-aid/undergraduate-admissions/tuition-reset/? 
Capital University 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit 50 percent tuition reduction for incoming 
undergraduates whose families have chosen mission-
centered careers through nonprofit and public-service 
work under the Good Guarantee program 
  X     X     
Cornish College of the Arts 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit           X     
Elizabethtown College  2019-2020 Private not-for-profit     X     X     
Elmira College 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit     X     X     
Greensboro College 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit           X     
Ontario Province 2019-2020 Public  10 per cent tuition rate cut on all publicly assisted 
college and universities in Ontario for the 2019-2020 
academic year; not applicable to foreign students. 
        X     
St. John's College (NY) 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit (Santa Fe, NM and Annapolis MD)   X     X     
University of Sioux Falls  2019-2020 Private not-for-profit           X     
University of the Cumberlands 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit           X     
Wells College (NY) 2019-2020 Private not-for-profit           X     
* Note: More data will be coming available in Fall 2019 for analysis. 
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 http://www.glenville.edu/news/? p=24959 
 http://www.grace.edu/newsandevents/? p=8686 
 http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article176099841.html 
 http://www.lasalle.edu/tuitionreset/ 
 http://www.masters.edu/news/increase-in-opportunity-through-decrease-in-tuition?utm_source=All+Emails+Active&utm_campaign=71c83d25e1-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_11_13&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3ece201a10-71c83d25e1-181935489 
 http://www.nj.com/education/2017/09/one_of_njs_costliest_universities_slashes_tuition.html 
 http://www.omaha.com/news/education/college-of-st-mary-to-cut-sticker-price-by-citing/article_3d926a3c-1efe-5eef-923e-e59867649fd7.html 
 http://www.poorhandmaids.org/index.php/latest-news/current-events/item/45-ancilla-college-lowers-tuition-costs 
 http://www.register-herald.com/news/glenville-state-college-lowering-tuition-by-percent/article_2eadc3d0-da0d-11e7-b73e-572a36719380.html 
 http://www.rosemont.edu/admissions/tuition-and-aid/our-tuition-promise/media-coverage.php 
 http://www.sentinel-echo.com/kentucky/news/university-of-the-cumberlands-announces-percent-cut-of-tuition/article_a095849d-a240-5e2e-8656-ef19002a57a6.html 
 http://www.thestate.com/news/local/education/article208435774.html 
 http://www.utica.edu/uc/affordability-initiative/ 
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Appendix B 
A single data set was required to perform this study. Below is the data dictionary used with notes regarding variable names, sources, definitions, and modifications to source data. 
Table B1       
Data dictionary and detailed variable definitions  
Measure  Variable Name Source Definition 
Institution ID UnitID IPEDS: Institutional 
Characteristics 
Identification number used by the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Postsecondary 
Education (OPE) to identify schools that have Program Participation Agreements (PPA) so 
that its students are eligible to participate in Federal Student Financial Assistance programs 
under Title IV regulations. This is a 6-digit number followed by a 2-digit suffix used to 
identify branches, additional locations, and other entities that are part of the eligible 
institution. 
Institution Name Institution Name IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Name of the institution 
Year of Reset Year of Reset Observation By Observation or press announcement 
Before 2008 Before_2008 Calculation If Year of Reset < 2008, Before_2008 = 1, Else Before_2008 = 0 
Population 100 miles 100Population CAPS: U.S. CENSUS Population within 100 miles circumference of the campus zip code. 
Population Density within 100 
miles 
100Density CAPS: U.S. CENSUS Average population density for the area within 100 mils circumference of the campus zip 
code. 
Population 200 miles 200Population CAPS: U.S. CENSUS Population within 100 miles circumference of the campus zip code. 
Population Density within 200 
miles 
200Density CAPS: U.S. CENSUS Average population density for the area within 100 mils circumference of the campus zip 
code. 
Percent of 200 in 100 PCTof200in100 Calculation PCTof200in100 = 100Population / 200 Population 
Ratio of 100 in 200 Ratio100in200 Calculation Ratio100in200 = 100Density / 200Density 
Southwest Census Region Southwest IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Southwest AZ NM OK TX 
Far West Census Region Far_West IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Far West AK CA HI NV OR WA 
Mideast Census Region Mid_East IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Mid East DE DC MD NJ NY PA 
Southeast Census Region Southeast IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Southeast AL AR FL GA KY LA MS NC SC TN VA WV 
Great Lakes Census Region Great_Lakes IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Great Lakes IL IN MI OH WI 
Plains Census Region Plains IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Plains IA KS MN MO NE ND SD 
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New England Census Region New_England IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
New England CT ME MA NH RI VT 
Rocky Mountains Census Region Rocky_Mountains IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Rocky Mountains CO ID MT UT WY 
Multi-location Census Region MultiLocation IPEDS: Institutional 
characteristics 
Major formally recognized administrative units exist in multiple states. 
Tuition and Fees - Year -3 TuitionandFees_YMinus3 IPEDS: Student Charges The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most frequently 
charged to students. These values represent what a typical student would be charged and may 
not be the same for all students atan institution. If tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour 
basis, the average full-time credit hour load for an entire academic year is used to estimate 
average tuition. Required fees include all fixed sum charges that arerequired of such a large 
proportion of all students that the student who does not pay the charges is an exception. 
Three years prior to reset. 
Tuition and Fees - Year -1 TuitionandFees_YMinus1 IPEDS: Student Charges The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most frequently 
charged to students. These values represent what a typical student would be charged and may 
not be the same for all students at 
an institution. If tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour basis, the average full-time credit 
hour load for an entire academic year is used to estimate average tuition. Required fees 
include all fixed sum charges that are 
required of such a large proportion of all students that the student who does not pay the 
charges is an exception. One year prior to reset. 
Tuition and Fees - Year 0 TuitionandFees_Y0 IPEDS: Student Charges The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most frequently 
charged to students. These values represent what a typical student would be charged and may 
not be the same for all students at 
an institution. If tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour basis, the average full-time credit 
hour load for an entire academic year is used to estimate average tuition. Required fees 
include all fixed sum charges that are 
required of such a large proportion of all students that the student who does not pay the 
charges is an exception. In the first-year at the new reduced rate. 
Room and Board - Year -3 RoomandBoard_YMinus3 IPEDS: Student Charges ROOM CHARGES - The charges for an academic year for rooming accommodations for a 
typical student sharing a room with one other student.  
BOARD CHARGES - The charge for an academic year for meals, for a specified number of 
meals per week. Three years prior to reset. 
Room and Board - Year -1 RoomandBoard_YMinus1 IPEDS: Student Charges ROOM CHARGES - The charges for an academic year for rooming accommodations for a 
typical student sharing a room with one other student.  
BOARD CHARGES - The charge for an academic year for meals, for a specified number of 
meals per week. One year prior to reset. 
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Room and Board - Year 0 RoomandBoard_Y0 IPEDS: Student Charges ROOM CHARGES - The charges for an academic year for rooming accommodations for a 
typical student sharing a room with one other student.  
BOARD CHARGES - The charge for an academic year for meals, for a specified number of 
meals per week. During the first-year with the new tuition and fee amount. 
Sticker Price - Year -3 StickerPrice_YMinus3 Calculation StickerPrice_YMinus3 = TuitionandFees_YMinus3 + RoomandBoard_YMinus3 
Sticker Price - Year -1 StickerPrice_YMinus1 Calculation StickerPrice_YMinus1 = TuitionandFees_YMinus1 + RoomandBoard_YMinus1 
Sticker price Year 0 StickerPrice_Y0 Calculation StickerPrice_Y0 = TuitionandFees_Y0 + RoomandBoard_Y0 
Sticker Price Change StickerPrice_CHG Calculation StickerPrice_CHG = StickerPrice_Y0 - StickerPrice_YMinus1 
Sticker Price Change by Percent StickerPrice_CHG_PCT Calculation StickerPrice_CHG_PCT = (StickerPrice_Y0 - StickerPrice_YMinus1) / 
StickerPrice_YMinus1 
Applications - Year -3 Apps_YMinus3 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
APPLICANT - An individual who has fulfilled the institution’s requirements to be 
considered for admission (including payment or waiving of the application fee, if any) and 
who has been notified of one of the following actions: admission, nonadmission, placement 
on waiting list, or application withdrawn (by applicant or institution). Three years prior to 
reset. 
Applications - Year -1 Apps_YMinus1 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
APPLICANT - An individual who has fulfilled the institution’s requirements to be 
considered for admission (including payment or waiving of the application fee, if any) and 
who has been notified of one of the following actions: admission, nonadmission, placement 
on waiting list, or application withdrawn (by applicant or institution). One year prior to the 
reset. 
Applications - Year 0 Apps_Y0 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
APPLICANT - An individual who has fulfilled the institution’s requirements to be 
considered for admission (including payment or waiving of the application fee, if any) and 
who has been notified of one of the following actions: admission, nonadmission, placement 
on waiting list, or application withdrawn (by applicant or institution). During the year of the 
reset. 
Applications Trend App_Trend Calculation App_Trend = (Apps_YMinus1 - Apps_YMinus3) / Apps_YMinus3 
Applications Change App_CHG Calculation App_CHG = Apps_Y0 - Apps_YMinus1 
Applications Change by Percent App_CHG_PCT Calculation App_CHG_PCT = (Apps_Y0 - Apps_YMinus1) / Apps_YMinus1 
Admits - Year -3 Admits_YMinus3 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
ADMISSIONS - Applicants that have been granted an official offer to enroll in a college or 
university. Three years prior to the reset. 
Admits - Year -1 Admits_YMinus1 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
ADMISSIONS - Applicants that have been granted an official offer to enroll in a college or 
university. One year prior to the reset. 
Admits Year 0 Admits_Y0 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
ADMISSIONS - Applicants that have been granted an official offer to enroll in a college or 
university. During the first-year of the reset. 
Admits Trend Admit_Trend Calculation Admits_Trend = (Admits_YMinus1 - Admits_YMinus3) / Admits_YMinus3 
Admit Rate Change AdmitRate_CHG Calculation Admits_CHG = Admits_Y0 - Admits_YMinus1 
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Enrolled - Year -3 Enrolled_YMinus3 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
The number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who applied, 
were admitted, and enrolled (full or part time) at an institution for the most recent fall period 
available. Include early decision, early action, and students who began studies during the 
summer prior to that fall. Three years prior to a tuition reset. 
Enrolled - Year -1 Enrolled_YMinus1 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
The number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who applied, 
were admitted, and enrolled (full or part time) at an institution for the most recent fall period 
available. Include early decision, early action, and students who began studies during the 
summer prior to that fall. One year prior to a tuition reset. 
Enrolled - Year 0 Enrolled_Y0 IPEDS: Admissions and 
Test Scores 
The number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who applied, 
were admitted, and enrolled (full or part time) at an institution for the most recent fall period 
available. Include early decision, early action, and students who began studies during the 
summer prior to that fall. During the year of a tuition reset. 
Enrolled Trend Enrolled_Trend Calculation Enrolled_Trend = (Enrolled_YMinus1 - Enrolled_YMinus3) / Enrolled_YMinus3 
Enrolled Change Enrolled_CHG Calculation Enrolled_CHG = Enrolled_Y0 - Enrolled_YMinus1 
Enrolled Change by percent Enrolled_CHG_PCT Calculation Enrolled_CHG_PCT = (Enrolled_Y0 - Enrolled_YMinus1) / Enrolled_YMinus1 
Yield Rate Change Yield_CHG Calculation Yield_CHG = ((Enrolled_Y0 / Admits_Y0) - (Enrolled_YMinus1/Admits_YMinus1)) 
Reset Success by Enrollment Reset_Success_Enrollment Calculation If Enrolled_Y0>=(Enrolled_YMinus1*1.05) Then Reset_Success_Enrollment=1, Else 
Reset_Success_Enrollment=0 
Sticker Price Elasticity of 
Demand 
PED_Sticker Calculation PED_Sticker = ((Enrolled_YMinus3 - Enrolled_YMinus1) / Enrolled_YMinus3) / 
((StickerPrice_YMinus3 - StickerPrice_YMinus1)/ StickerPrice_Yminus3) 
Net Price Elasticity of Demand PED_Net Calculation PED_Net = ((Enrolled_YMinus3 - Enrolled_YMinus1) / Enrolled_YMinus3) / 
((NetPrice_YMinus3 - NetPrice_YMinus1)/ NetPrice_Yminus3) 
Net First-Year Revenue Change Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG Calculation Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG = (AvgNetPrice_Y0 * Enrolled_Y0) -(AvgNetPrice_YMinus1 * 
Enrolled_YMinus1) 
Net first-year Revenue Change by 
Percent 
Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT Calculation Net_Revenue_CHG_PCT = Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG / (AvgNetPrice_YMinus1 * 
Enrolled_YMinus1) 
Reset Success by First-Year Net 
Revenue 
Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue Calculation If FYNetRevenue_Y0>=(FYNetRevenue_YMinus1*1.05) Then 
Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue=1, Else Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue=0 
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Number of First-Year Enrolled 
Receiving Institutional Grant Aid 
- Year -3 
NumFYRecvIG_Yminus3 IPEDS: Student Financial 
Aid and Net Price 
Number of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were 
awarded institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships). Institutional grants - Scholarships 
and fellowships granted and funded by the institution and/or individual departments within 
the institution, (i.e., instruction, research, public service) that may contribute indirectly to the 
enhancement of these programs. Includes scholarships targeted to certain individuals (e.g., 
based on state of residence, major field of study, athletic team participation) for which the 
institution designates the recipient. Three years prior to a tuition reset. 
Average first-year Institutional 
Grant Aid Amount - Year -3 
AvgFYIGAid_YMinus3 IPEDS: Student Financial 
Aid and Net Price 
Average amount of institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships) awarded to full-time, first-
time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students. Three years prior to a tuition reset. 
Number of First-Year Enrolled 
Receiving Institutional Grant Aid 
- Year -1 
NumFYRecvIG_Yminus1 IPEDS: Student Financial 
Aid and Net Price 
Number of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were 
awarded institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships). Institutional grants - Scholarships 
and fellowships granted and funded by the institution and/or individual departments within 
the institution, (i.e., instruction, research, public service) that may contribute indirectly to the 
enhancement of these programs. Includes scholarships targeted to certain individuals (e.g., 
based on state of residence, major field of study, athletic team participation) for which the 
institution designates the recipient. One year prior to a tuition reset. 
Average first-year Institutional 
Grant Aid Amount - Year -1 
AvgFYIGAid_YMinus1 IPEDS: Student Financial 
Aid and Net Price 
Average amount of institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships) awarded to full-time, first-
time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students. One year prior to a tuition reset. 
Number of First-Year Enrolled 
Receiving Institutional Grant Aid 
- Year 0 
NumFYRecvIG_Y0 IPEDS: Student Financial 
Aid and Net Price 
Number of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were 
awarded institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships). Institutional grants - Scholarships 
and fellowships granted and funded by the institution and/or individual departments within 
the institution, (i.e., instruction, research, public service) that may contribute indirectly to the 
enhancement of these programs. Includes scholarships targeted to certain individuals (e.g., 
based on state of residence, major field of study, athletic team participation) for which the 
institution designates the recipient. During the year of the tuition reset. 
Average first-year Institutional 
Grant Aid Amount - Year 0 
AvgFYIGAid_Y0 IPEDS: Student Financial 
Aid and Net Price 
Average amount of institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships) awarded to full-time, first-
time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students. During the year of a tuition reset. 
Average Net Price - Year -3 AvgNetPrice_YMinus3 Calculation AvgNetPrice_YMinus3 = ((TuitionandFees_YMinus3 + RoomandBoard_Minus3) * 
Enrolled_YMinus3) - (AvgFYIGAid_YMinus3 * NumFYRecIG_YMinus3) 
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Average Net Price - Year -1 AvgNetPrice_YMinus1 Calculation AvgNetPrice_YMinus1 = ((TuitionandFees_YMinus1 + RoomandBoard_Minus1) * 
Enrolled_YMinus1) - (AvgFYIGAid_YMinus1 * NumFYRecIG_YMinus1) 
Average Net Price - Year 0 AvgNetPrice_Y0 Calculation AvgNetPrice_Y0 = ((TuitionandFees_Y0 + RoomandBoard_Minus3) * Enrolled_Y0) - 
(AvgFYIGAid_Y0 * NumFYRecIG_Y0) 
NACUBO Discount Rate - Year -
3 
DiscountRate_YMinus3 Calculation DiscountRate_YMinus3 = (NumFYRecvIG_YMinus3 * AvgFYIGAid_Minus3) / 
(Enrolled_Minus3 * TuitionandFees_Minus3) 
NACUBO Discount Rate - Year -
1 
DiscountRate_Prior Calculation DiscountRate_Prior = (NumFYRecvIG_YMinus1 * AvgFYIGAid_Minus1) / 
(Enrolled_Minus1 * TuitionandFees_Minus1) 
NACUBO Discount Rate - Year 
0 
DiscountRate_Y0 Calculation DiscountRate_Y0 = (NumFYRecvIG_Y0 * AvgFYIGAid_Y0) / (Enrolled_Y0 * 
TuitionandFees_Y0) 
NACUBO Discount Rate Trend DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior Calculation DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior = (DiscountRate_Prior - DiscountRate_YMinus3) / 
DiscountRate_YMinus3 
NACUBO Discount Rate Change NACUBO_DiscountRate_CHG Calculation NACUBO_DiscountRate_CHG = DiscountRate_Y0 - DiscountRate_YMinus3 
NACUBO Discount Rate 
Decrease 
NACUBO_DR_DECREASE Calculation If NACUBO_DiscountRate_CHG <0, NACUBO_DR_DECREASE = 1, Else 
NACUBO_DR_DECREASE = 0 
Percent Pell_ Year -1 PercentPell_YearPrior IPEDS Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who 
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV, 
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate 
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses. 
One year prior to tuition reset. 
Percent Pell Change PercentPell_CHG Calculation PercentPell_CHG = PercentPell_Y0 - PercentPell_YearPrior 
Percent Pell-Year 0 PercentPell_Y0 IPEDS Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who 
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV, 
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate 
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses. 
During the year of a tuition reset. 
Percent Pell - Year 1 PercentPell_Y1 IPEDS Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who 
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV, 
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate 
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses. 
One year following a tuition reset. 
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Percent Pell - Year 2 PercentPell_Y2 IPEDS Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who 
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV, 
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate 
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses. 
Two years following a tuition reset. 
Percent Pell - Year 3 PercentPell_Y3 IPEDS Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who 
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV, 
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate 
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses. 
Three years following a tuition reset. 
Retention Rate - Year -1 Retention_YMinus3 IPEDS The full-time retention rate is the percent of the (fall full-time cohort from the prior year 
minus exclusions from the fall full-time cohort) that re-enrolled at the institution as either 
full- or part-time in the current year. One year prior to the tuition reset. 
Retention Rate - Year 0 Retention_YMinus1 IPEDS The full-time retention rate is the percent of the (fall full-time cohort from the prior year 
minus exclusions from the fall full-time cohort) that re-enrolled at the institution as either 
full- or part-time in the current year. During the year of a tuition reset. 
Retention Rate Change Retention_CHG Calculation Retention_CHG = Retention_Y0 - Retention_YMinus1 
Debt related to Property Plant and 
Equipment - Year -1 
Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_YearPrior Form 990   
Property Plant and Equipment net 
of accumulated depreciation - 
Year -1 
PropertyPlantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YearPrior Form 990   
Permanently restricted net assets 
included in total restricted net 
assets - Year -1 
PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YearPrior Form 990   
Temporarily restricted net assets - 
Year -1 
TempRestNetAssets_YearPrior Form 990   
Total unrestricted net assets - 
Year -1 
TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior Form 990   
Total net assets - Year -1 TotalNetAssets_YearPrior Form 990   
Total expenses - Year -1 TotalExpns_YearPrior Form 990   
Total Revenue - Year -1 TotalRevenue_YearPrior Form 990   
Debt related to Property Plant and 
Equipment - Year -2 
Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_YMinus2 Form 990   
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Property Plant and Equipment net 
of accumulated depreciation - 
Year -2 
PropertyPlantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YMinus2 Form 990   
Permanently restricted net assets 
included in total restricted net 
assets - Year -2 
PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YMinus2 Form 990   
Temporarily restricted net assets - 
Year -2 
TempRestNetAssets_YMinus2 Form 990   
Total unrestricted net assets - 
Year -2 
TotalUnrestNetAssets_YMinus2 Form 990   
Total net assets - Year -2 TotalNetAssets_YMinus2 Form 990   
Total expenses - Year -2 TotalExpns_YMinus2 Form 990   
Total Revenue - Year -2 TotalRevenue_YMinus2 Form 990   
Advertising and Promotion Spend 
- Year -2 
AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2 Form 990   
Advertising and Promotion Spend 
- Year -1 
AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior Form 990   
Change in Advertising and 
Promotion Spend 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG Calculation AdvertsingPromotion_CHG = AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior - 
AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2 
Change in Advertising and 
Promotion Spend by Percentage 
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT Calculation AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT = (AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior - 
AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2) / AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2 
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Equity Ratio - Year -1 Equity_Ratio_YearPrior IPEDS Equity ratio for public and private-not-for profit institutions using FASB standards is derived 
as follows:  
 
Total net assets (F2A06) divided by total assets (F2A02) One year prior to the tuition reset. 
 
Net assets are the excess of assets over liabilities or the residual interest in the institution's 
assets remaining after liabilities are deducted. The change in net assets results from revenues, 
gains, expenses, and losses. FASB institutions classify net assets into three categories: 
permanently restricted, temporarily restricted, and unrestricted. GASB institutions classify 
net assets into three categories: invested in capital, net of related debt; restricted (with 
separate displays of restricted-expendable and restricted-nonexpendable net assets); and 
unrestricted. Although the terms are similar, the composition of the categories of net assets 
between FASB and GASB institutions can differ significantly.  
 
Total assets include  
a) Cash, cash equivalents, and temporary investments;  
b) Receivables (net of allowance for uncollectible amounts);  
c) Inventories, prepaid expenses, and deferred charges;  
d) Amounts held by trustees for construction and debt service;  
e) Long-term investments;  
f) Plant, property, and equipment; and,  
g) Other assets 
Endowment per FTE Student - 
Year -1 
EndowmentperFTE_YearPrior IPEDS Endowment assets (year-end) per FTE enrollment for public and private not-for-profit 
institutions using FASB standards is derived as follows: Endowment assets (year-end) 
(F2H02) divided by 12-month FTE enrollment (FTE12MN). One year prior to the tuition 
reset. Endowment assets are gross investments of endowment funds, term endowment funds, 
and funds functioning as endowment for the institution and any of its foundations and other 
affiliated organizations. Endowment funds are funds whose principal is nonexpendable (true 
endowment) and that are intended to be invested to provide earnings for institutional use. 
Term endowment funds are funds which the donor has stipulated that the principal may be 
expended after a stated period or on the occurrence of a certain event. Funds functioning as 
endowment (quasi-endowment funds) are established by the governing board to function like 
an endowment fund but which may be totally expended at any time at the discretion of the 
governing board. These funds represent nonmandatory transfers from the current fund rather 
than a direct addition to the endowment fund, as occurs for the true endowment categories. 
The full-time-equivalent (FTE) enrollment used is the sum of the institutions’ FTE 
undergraduate enrollment and FTE graduate enrollment (as calculated from or reported on 
the 12-month Enrollment component) plus the estimated FTE of first-professional students. 
Undergraduate and graduate FTE are estimated using 12-month instructional activity (credit 
and/or contact hours).  
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Operating Reserve Ratio - Year -
1 
Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior Calculation (CFI) Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior+TempRestNet 
Assets - (PropertyPLantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YearPrior - 
Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_Year_Prior))/TotExpns_YearPrior 
Viability Ratio - Year -1 ViabilityRatio_YearPrior Calculation (CFI) Viability_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior+TempRestNet Assets - 
(PropertyPLantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YearPrior - 
Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_Year_Prior))/Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_Year_Prior 
Change in Net Assets - Year -1 Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior Calculation (CFI) Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalNetAssets_YearPrior - 
TotalNetAssets_YMinus2) / TotalNetAssets_YMinus2 
Operating Margin Ratio - Year -1 Operating_Margin_Ratio_YearPrior Calculation (CFI) Operating_Margin_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior - 
TotalUnrestNetAssets_YMinus2) / (TotalRevenue_YearPrior - 
((PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YearPrior - 
PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YMinus2) + (TempRestNetAssets_YearPrior 
- TempRestNetAssets_YMinus2)) 
CFI Score - Year -1 FIT_SCORE_CFI_YearPrior Calculation (CFI) FIT_SCORE_CFI_YearPrior = (Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X .35) + 
(ViabilityRatio_YearPrior X .35) + (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior X .20) + 
(Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X .10) 
CFI Score Minus Debt - Year -1 FIT_SCORE_CFI_ModifiedNODEBT_YearPrior Calculation (CFI) FIT_SCORE_CFI_ModifiedNODEBT_YearPrior = (Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X 
.55) + (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior X .30) + (Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X .15) 
        
        
 
Appendix C. 
This study makes extensive use of the principle of price elasticity of demand as 
applied to sticker price elasticity for first-year students (PED_Sticker), sticker price 
elasticity for transfer students (PED_Sticker_XFR) and net price elasticity of first-year 
students (PED_Net) as defined in the Definition of Terms and Appendix A. Appendix C 
provides further explanation for interpretation of price elasticity using the direct result of 
the price elasticity formula rather than the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand 
formula which is is standard practice in most economics textbooks. 
Price elasticity of demand defined and use of absolute value 
Price elasticity of demand (or PED) is a microeconomic principle to quantify the 
influence of price changes on demand. Alfred C Marshall, credited with defining the 
concept said (2006), “Elasticity of demand may be defined as the percentage change in 
quantity demanded to the percentage change in price”. Accordingly, the formula for point 
price elasticity is as follows (Boyes, 2012; Fischer et al., 1988): 
PED = Percent change in quantity demanded / Percent change in price 
The value of PED can be understood to refer to the percent change in demand for 
a 1% increase in price. If a price increases 5% and demand declines 10% as a result, the 
value for PED is calculated to be -2. Each 1% increase in price results in a 2% reduction 
in demand. Results from the PED formula are negative for most goods in most industries. 
Economists refer to price elasticity based on the absolute value of PED, so larger values 
indicate a greater level of elastic behavior (Boyes, 2012; Fischer et al., 1988; Intelligent 
Economist, 2019; tutor2u, 2019). As applied to our example, although the results of the 
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PED equation is actually -2, economists will say the PED is 2. If PED for a different 
good is -3, economists will say PED is higher at 3 even though the result of the PED 
equation (-3) is lower than -2.  
Ranges of PED linked to strategies to maximize total revenue 
Building on this use of absolute value to describe the results of PED, different 
ranges for PED imply the need for different strategies to maximize total revenue. Table 
30 provides explanations of price elasticity of demand from standard economic textbooks 
and online resources which outline PED ranges with associated strategies to maximize 
net revenue (Boyes, 2012; Fischer et al., 1988; Intelligent Economist, 2019; tutor2u, 
2019): 
Table 30 
Price elasticity of demand types and strategy implications 
Direct 
results from 
PED 
calculation 
(1) 
Absolute 
value of 
PED (2) 
Type of 
PED 
Price 
increase will 
Price 
decrease will 
Note 
X > 0 X < 0 Veblen good Increase total 
revenue 
Decrease 
total revenue 
Increased demand 
with higher prices 
0 0 Perfectly 
inelastic 
Increase total 
revenue 
Decrease 
total revenue 
 
0 > X > -1 0 < X < 1 Relatively 
inelastic 
Increase total 
revenue 
Decrease 
total revenue 
Demand decreases 
less than results of 
increased prices 
-1 1 Unit elastic No effect No effect Net revenue the 
same, gains from 
price increase 
offset by lost 
volume 
-1 > X > ∞ 1 < X < ∞ Relatively 
elastic 
Decrease 
total revenue 
Increase total 
revenue 
Reduction of price 
increases total 
revenue, price 
sensitive 
-∞ ∞ Perfectly 
elastic 
Eliminate all 
total revenue 
Unlimited 
total revenue 
Theoretical 
construct of perfect 
competition 
Note: (1) Results from PED Calculation in raw form. (2) Economists typically speak of PED using 
absolute value. 
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Confounding the issue of Veblen goods 
Veblen goods are special product categories where higher prices signal exclusivity 
which is itself valuable. These product categories are exceptional in that they have 
positive results for PED which could be confusing to readers who are familiar with the 
typical convention of referring to PED as an absolute value of the negative ratio. 
Restated, if a price increase of 2% results in a 4% increase in enrollment, the raw result 
of PED is +2 which is a result in the Veblen effect range. Multiple studies suggest higher 
education pricing can reflect Veblen effects (Lambert, 1999; McConnell et al., 2018). 
Conventions in this study 
This study will use the direct results of the PED formula when providing results 
from Sticker price elasticity and net price elasticity. While acknowledging this is a break 
from convention commonly used in economics, it will allow for clearer interpretation of 
results where ranges of results may contrast populations that respond to price increases in 
both positive and negative patterns. 
